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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The Problem 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States benefited 
from relatively stable monetary policy. Inflation was low 
and shifts in monetary policy were few. This stability 
largely reflected the weakness of monetary policy as a 
domestic policy tool under the prevailing international 
monetary system of fixed exchange rates, known as the Bretton-
Woods arrangement. Under fixed exchange rates, changes in the 
money supply of any country (except the U.S.), must be offset 
by adjustments in official reserves as the government attempts 
to hold the value of its currency constant (Stern, 1973). 
At the same time, the U.S. agricultural sector was 
growing rapidly. This growth, however, was rooted in the 
strength of the domestic rather than the export market. Until 
the mid-1960s, the United States was a net importer of agri­
cultural products and only a marginal net exporter through the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. Consequently, the relationship be­
tween the agricultural sector and monetary policy were not 
obvious, well-understood, or perhaps even significant. 
According to Schuh (1983) , "the nature of our economic 
system was such that monetary policy had little effect on 
agriculture." 
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A number of events occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s 
that have greatly enhanced the impact of monetary policy on 
the agricultural sector. In fact, Schuh (1983) has argued 
that agriculture became one of the sectors of the U.S. 
economy that bears an important share of adjustments to 
changes in monetary policy. Following World War II, U.S. 
balance of payments (BOP) deficits served as a source from 
which the reconstructed nations of Western Europe and Japan 
replenished their stocks of international reserves (Grubel, 
1977). U.S. balance of payments deficit problems intensified 
in the late 19 60s as the money supply began to grow rapidly 
to finance the Vietnam War (Grubel, 1977). As U.S. deficits 
increased, the BOP surpluses of other countries grew. 
The increasing U.S. deficit and the unwillingness of 
U.S. trade partners to revalue their currencies led the 
United States to devalue the dollar by almost 10% against 
special drawing rights (SDKs) and to close its gold window 
in 1971. The dollar devaluation sent a shock wave through 
the international community and set the stage for the demise 
of the Bretton-Woods arrangement. The final breakdown 
occurred in March 1973 when the U.S. devalued the dollar for 
a second time. 
Following the move from fixed to flexible exchange 
rates, U.S. monetary policy became unstable as U.S. monetary 
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authorities "embarked on zig-zag, stop and go monetary poli­
cies that appear to be still with us today" (Schuh, 1983). 
The increased volatility of the money supply led directly to 
increased volatility in the value of the dollar, and, hence, 
in U.S. prices and exports. Under a fixed exchange rate 
system, and in the absence of trade barriers, a change in the 
money supply that affects the domestic price level will re­
sult in a corresponding change in foreign prices, according to 
the Purchasing Power Parity doctrine. Under flexible rates, 
however, the same change in the money supply and corresponding 
change in domestic price levels is matched by an offsetting 
change in the exchange rate. As a consequence, the export 
sector of an economy bears a large share of the adjustment 
to changes in monetary policy. 
At the same time that monetary policy became more un­
stable with a greater impact on the export sector, growth and 
prosperity of the U.S. economy as a whole, and the agri­
cultural sector in particular, became increasingly dependent 
on a strong export performance. Currently, the output from 
about two out of every five acres of land is exported and 
over 27% of farm cash receipts come from exports. Conse­
quently, the U.S. agricultural sector, its growth, and 
prospertiy have become closely linked to monetary policy. 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system, the 
relationship between the overall U.S. economy and the 
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agricultural sector has become the center of a lively debate. 
A number of researchers have investigated various aspects of 
the macrolinkages to agriculture (Gardner, 19 81). Never­
theless, most of this research has focused on the effect of 
exchange rate changes on agricultural exports and prices with 
little attention to the effect of changes in monetary policy 
on U.S. agriculture through their effects on the exchange 
rate. The following review of literature begins with a con­
sideration of the post-1973 studies dealing with the macro-
linkages of U.S. agriculture. This review will reveal that 
the primary focus has been on the exchange rate as an ex­
ogenous factor rather than as an endogenous monetary factor 
affecting U.S. agriculture. 
Review of Literature 
Schuh (1974) argued that since at least the early or 
mid-1950s, the explanation of "the U.S. farm problem" has 
been partially wrong because of the omission of exchange 
rates from the analysis. Using the induced technical change 
model of Hayami and Ruttan, Schuh argued that exchange rates 
play an important role in trade, in the valuation of resources 
within the U.S. economy, in the distribution of benefits of 
economic progress between consumers and producers, and in the 
way the benefits of technical change are shared between the 
domestic economy and the world. 
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Most analysts of the late 1970s listed the temporarily 
bad weather conditions outside the U.S., the decline of the 
Peruvian fish industry, and the sudden increases in U.S. ex­
ports to the Soviet Union as the economic factors responsible 
for the mid-1973 price explosion. Schuh's analysis, however, 
suggested that an important share of the rise in agricultural 
prices in that period was the result of an adjustment to a 
previously overvalued exchange rate which induced an export 
boom in an economy that was already responding to expansive 
monetary policies, and, in the case of agriculture, increased 
the foreign demand for U.S. output at the same time that this 
demand was already rising. 
Much of the literature since 1974 has revolved around the 
size of the exchange rate elasticity of foreign demand for 
U.S. agricultural commodities. Articles by Vellianitis-
Fidas (1975), Kost (1976), and Johnson, Grennes, and Thursby 
(1977) took serious issue with Schuh's conclusions. 
Vellianitis-Fidas referred to her econometric results 
stating that the U.S. wheat and corn exports are inelastic 
with respect to the U.S. exchange rate changes. Using a two-
country, one-commodity free trade partial equilibrium analysis, 
Kost applied a theoretical model to graphically assess the 
impact of the exchange rate on U.S. agriculture. He argued 
that the impact of exchange rate changes on quantity is small 
when domestic demand and supply are inelastic. He further 
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argued that because the elasticity of :)oth supply and demand 
is very low, particularly in the short run, for U.S. agri­
cultural products, a devaluation would generate relatively 
larger changes in price than in quantity traded for agri­
cultural products as opposed to industrial goods. He also 
emphasized that the proportional increase in price or quantity 
of traded goods in response to a devaluation is restricted to 
being less than or equal to the percent of devaluation. Kost 
(1976, p. 104) concluded: "In summary, we can only expect a 
small impact on agricultural trade as a result of a change in 
exchange rates." 
Using linear excess supply and demand curves, for a free 
trade, partial equilibrium, two-country, and one-commodity 
world, Bredahl (1976) concluded that, indeed, the elasticity 
of price with respect to the exchange rate (E^ has no 
a priori lower bound. Bredahl's calculations suggested that 
the effect on price of a change in the exchange rate is 
greatest when excess supply is relatively less elastic, 
while the impact on quantity increases as the elasticity of 
excess supply increases. The change in quantity also in­
creases as the elasticity of excess demand increases in abso­
lute value so that the largest effect of a devaluation on the 
total value of exports occurs when both elasticities are rela­
tively large. 
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Within this context, it was natural that discussion of the 
effects of changes in the exchange rate would focus, in part, 
on the question of appropriate values for these elasticities. 
Most attention, however, was paid to the price elasticities 
of the total excess demand facing the United States. 
An important problem that arose in the empirical work 
was the wide range of estimates for the elasticity of the 
excess demand curve facing the United States. For example, 
using subjective values for domestic supply and demand price 
elasticities, Tweeten (1967) initially derived the price 
elasticity of the total export demand for U.S. agricultural 
commodities to be -15.9. However, after considering world 
trade restrictions, it was reduced to -6.3. At the same 
time, other direct statistical estimates of this elasticity 
were much smaller than those of Tweeten (see Stern, 1978) . 
The debate then focused on the discrepancy between the 
derived and direct estimates of the excess demand elasticity. 
Bredahl, Meyers and Collins (1979) argued that the government 
policies of major importers of U.S. commodities should be in­
corporated to arrive at a realistic estimate of the elasticity. 
They concluded that Tweeten's estimate of the elasticity of 
excess demand is simply not "in line with what is known about 
the world with insulated agricultural markets." They stated 
that trading behaviors (including government policies) 
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affecting world price transmission should be considered 
directly. They showed that if "elasticity of price trans­
mission"^ is zero for a particular country, a change in world 
price, or a currency devaluation by an exporter would have 
no effect on the domestic markets in that country and, 
therefore, no effect on its import demand. Then, by 
assigning subjective values to the elasticities of price 
transmission of major importers of U.S. agricultural com­
modities, they calculated the price elasticities of total 
import demand for major U.S. export commodities. The esti­
mates were much smaller than in the base case of perfect 
2 price transmission. 
The divergence in the conclusions of these studies 
^Elasticity of price transmission was defined as: 
dP^ i ET = • —:— , where P is the price in country i, 
dP pi 
and 
pWld is the world price. 
If ET = 1, then the price transmission is said to be 
perfect. 
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The estimated excess demand elasticity on the basis of 
implied elasticity of price transmission ranged from -.47 
for soybeans, to -2.36 for sorghum, compared to -1.12 for 
soybeans, to -5.5 for wheat under the assumption of perfect 
price transmission for all importing countries. 
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concerning the effect of exchange rates on the agricultural 
sector also led to the belief that the difference in the 
outcome may be caused by alternative specification of excess 
demand and supply equations. One such study is by Chambers 
and Just (1979). They argued that excess demand and supply 
equations must include all prices and income, since neo­
classical demand and supply functions are the results of 
utility and profit maximization. Their model treated all 
prices, the exchange rate, and income as demand shifters and 
all prices and the exchange rate as supply shifters. By 
changing prices of competing commodities, a devaluation will 
cause shifts of both the supply and the demand curves. Fur­
ther, demand shifts need not be pure percentage shifts as is 
the case when the exchange rate is the only demand shifter. 
They concluded, therefore, that there is no a priori reason 
to expect the price or quantity change to be less in per­
centage terms than the change in the exchange rate. 
The implication of their conclusions on empirical work 
was that the assumption of zero cross-price elasticity, i.e., 
exclusion of all other prices, distorts the elasticity esti­
mates. Such an assumption presupposes that exchange rate 
movements and own-price movements in the exporting country 
have the same effect on excess demand. For example, Japan's 
decision about how much grain to import from the United States 
is probably determined to some extent by the volume of other 
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imports from the United States and, to some extent, by the 
volume of its exports to the United States, both of which 
would be affected by an exchange rate devaluation. 
In addition. Chambers and Just (1979) argue that there 
is further reason to believe that exchange rate movements 
should be differentiated from market price movements. 
Orcutt (1960) hypothesized that economic agents react more 
quickly to exchange rate changes than market price changes in 
a world of fixed exchange rates. This is because changes in 
the exchange rate under a fixed regime are perceived as being 
more permanent than short-term price changes. Also, exchange 
rate movements usually involve a larger percentage change 
than agricultural prices, which are usually subject to govern­
mental pricing policies. Therefore, under a fixed exchange 
rate regime, adjustments may be faster to exchange rate 
changes than to price changes. 
Lastly, based on their findings. Chambers and Just 
propose alternative approaches to model exchange rate ef­
fects. First, they assume commodities are separable into 
three groups: the good in question, all other tradable, and 
nontradable items. Then, they construct price indices for 
the second two groups and include them as separate regressors 
in the import demand function, along with own prices. The 
tradable goods price index is weighted by the exchange rate. 
11 
This approach allows one to account for the indirect cross-
price elasticity effects on the good in question caused by 
a change in exchange rats. 
A more practical approach is to include the exchange 
rate as a separate regressor to represent the index for all 
other tradable goods, since construction of the indices 
may likely be impossible. The Orcutt hypothesis suggests 
including the exchange rate directly in excess demand 
equations to reflect the differential effects of exchange 
rate and price fluctuations. In fact, if differential adjust­
ments to price and exchange rate movement exist, one variable, 
say, deflated price, cannot represent both effects. 
Chambers and Just concluded that: (a) any study of the 
effect of devaluation (revaluation) on demand cannot ignore 
the cross-price effects, and (b) the domestic price response 
to exchange rate disturbances may be (but does not have to be) 
different from the response to foreign price disturbances. 
Grennes, Johnson, and Thursby (1980)^ and Reed (1980), 
This article was a response to Chambers and Just (19 79) 
who had criticized the Johnson, Grennes, and Thursby (1977) 
model as "equivalent to a simple one-good model." The latter 
was a multi-country trade flow share model (Armington, 19 69) to 
account for the cross elasticity effects among countries for 
wheat. Although later agreeing with Chambers and Just (1979) 
that prices of complement (substitute) and nontradable com­
modities should be included, Johnson et al. did not include 
those variables in their 19 77 analysis. The estimated impact 
of the exchange rate movements on U.S. wheat price was small, 
apparently because they had assumed a small value (.3) for the 
cross-elasticities. The supply of wheat and the exchange rate 
were exogenous in their study. 
12 
however, argued that the structural excess demand relation­
ship should not be distorted in order to capture the full 
effect of a change in exchange rate. They argued that 
economists must either model the entire economy of the 
countries in question or settle for a partial-effects esti­
mate of exchange rate. According to Grennes, Johnson, and 
Thursby (1980): "Whether the benefits of a larger model are 
worth the cost in terms of additional complexity is a question 
without an easy answer." 
Reed (1980) , while agreeing with the substance of the 
Chambers and Just article, objected to inclusion of a weighted 
price index of other tradable goods, insisting that the 
Purchasing Power Parity theory may not hold. Instead, Reed 
proposed to include an index of all domestic prices and 
prices of commodities judged to be close substitutes (comple­
ments) to circumvent the problems of cross-price effects on the 
good in question. He indicated that constructing an index 
of nontradable goods for all countries requires much data 
which are not necessarily available. Therefore, inclusion 
of an index of all domestic prices to account for cross-price 
effects of nontradable goods on the excess demand is the 
best that can be done. In addition. Reed indicated that for 
each and every price of a commodity included separately as a 
relatively close substitute (complement), a purchasing power 
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parity equation should be included.^ If purchasing power 
parity does not hold, he proposed a base period exchange rate 
series instead of yearly observations (Bjarnason, McGarry, 
and Schmitz , 1969). 
Reed also indicated that inclusion of the exchange rate 
as a separate variable to account for cross-elasticity ef­
fects of other tradable goods, as was suggested by Chambers 
and Just, is appropriate for short-run analyses under a 
fixed exchange rate regime because the assumption for this 
specification is that the exchange rate and the world price 
affect the domestic price unequally. Only in the short run 
and with fixed exchange rates can a change in exchange rate 
be viewed as a more permanent development than a change in the 
world price. That is, an exchange rate change is less likely 
to be reversed than a change in the world price. Therefore, 
adjustment to an exchange rate change may be more rapid than 
an equal change in the world price. 
In the long-run, there is no uncertainty as to the 
permanence of either an exchange rate or a world price change 
and, consequently, there is no difference between exchange 
rate and world price variations of equal magnitude, even under 
^Purchasing power parity requires that = e-P^, where: 
pi is the nominal price level in country i, pj is the nominal 
price level in country j, and e is the price of the jth 
country's currency in terms of the ith country's currency. 
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a fixed exchange rate regime. Nevertheless, differential 
response lags for exchange rate and world price changes may 
be different. To account for these differential response 
lags, a distributed lag framework with a constraint (that 
the sum of the weights for the coefficients of the two 
regressors be equal) has been used by Wilson and Takacs 
(1976). 
From the foregoing review of the exchange rate litera­
ture, three salient points emerge with respect to the 
empirical measurement of the effect of exchange rate changes 
on world agricultural market prices and quantities. First, 
the behavior of al.l world market participants must be in­
cluded in the model utilized. Second, in addition to the own 
price and income variables, the prices of the substitutes 
(complements), and nontradable commodities must be included 
in the excess supply and demand functions in the model. 
Third, insulating governmental policies must be taken into 
account in the model. 
An empirical analysis of the world market effects of 
U.S. exchange rate changes (fixed or flexible regime) re­
quires a multi-national trade model. A number of such models 
of agricultural trade have been built and surveyed in several 
studies. For example, Adams and Klein (1978), Adams and 
Behrman (19 78), Grennes, Johnson, and Thursby (19 77), Labys 
(1973, 1978), Sarris (1981), Schmitz (1979), Schuh (1979), 
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Thompson (1981), and Hausser (1983) all reviewed the meth­
odologies/applications of many such models. Thompson classi­
fies the models into three groups: spatial, nonspatial 
single homogeneous, and nonspatial differentiated product 
models. 
The intended use of the model dictates the appropriate 
choice of the methodology. Table 1.1 presents a matrix 
indicating various economic and policy questions and alterna­
tive empirical methods best suited for dealing with them. 
As mentioned earlier, the analysis of exchange rate 
impacts requires the explicit specification of the world 
market participants' behavior in the model. Thompson ex­
plained that nonspatial"equilibrium models can be used to 
explain the interrelationships among trading regions by in­
cluding the structure of the internal demands and supplies, 
government behavior, and the competitive structure of the 
industry. Past efforts to this end, however, have had some 
serious deficiencies which are best summarized by Thompson 
(19 81). He observes that some models of this type have 
internal demand and supply while others contain only export 
supply or import demand relationships for each region. 
A serious deficiency of many of these models is their 
negligence in including trade policies, given the considerable 
extent of tariff and nontariff interventions. Thompson 
indicates that distortions can easily be introduced into 
Table 1.1. The relevance of the various empirical trade models to some policy 
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^The symbol "X" means that the models are appropriate or have been used to 
deal with the problem. 
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simultaneous equation models. Domestic government policies 
are another neglected factor in many of these models. Con­
siderable evidence exists that domestic policy decisions 
are not exogenous to commodity markets and, therefore, 
should be endogenized. Thompson explains that policy reac­
tion functions and price transmission equations can easily 
be used to account for this endogeneity. Two other im­
portant endogenous variables have also been treated as ex­
ogenous: freight rates and currency exchange rates. Because 
of data unavailability, however, a major difficulty exists 
in including freight rates. 
The exogenous treatment of the exchange rate in world 
trade models has been criticized by Schuh (1981) and Chambers 
and Just (1981, 1982), as well as others. Schuh (1981) argued 
that since 197 3, three interrelated factors have greatly in­
fluenced the international world market: (1) growing inter­
nationalization of agricultural commodity markets, (2) in­
creased integration of international capital markets, and 
(3) the shift from a system of fixed exchange rates to a 
system of flexible exchange rates. 
Under fixed rates, external disequilibrium is offset 
by government actions to peg the exchange rate. Therefore, 
monetary policy affects the markets only through domestic 
channels. Furthermore, a fixed exchange rate can be viewed 
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as a policy tool which can be influential only when altered. 
Under a flexible regime, however, the rates are a function 
of numerous variables, of which monetary and fiscal poli­
cies are the most important. See Chapter II for the details 
of this link. 
Many others have emphasized this link empirically. Shei 
(1978), for example, simulated the impacts of the U.S. money 
supply on the U.S. farm sector. However, since the exchange 
rate was assumed to be fixed, the link between the money 
supply and the exchange rate was eliminated. Barnett et al. 
(1981), using the Granger Causality Test, showed the causality 
relationship between agricultural prices and the U.S. and world 
money supply. Epstein and Chambers (19 81) found evidence of 
a causal relationship between the exchange rate and agri­
cultural trade. Chambers and Just (1981) used a U.S. agri­
cultural model of corn, soybeans, and wheat to show the 
effect of the money supply on the prices, production, and 
disappearances of all three commodities. While they treated 
the exchange rate as endogenous, they did not include the 
prices of all substitutes (complements) and nontradable 
goods to appropriately account for the impacts of the exchange 
rate. In their 19 82 article, an attempt was made to do so. 
However, they stated that the data to construct the vari­
ables suggested as proxies in their 19 79 paper could not 
be found. Consequently, they applied Reed's (1980) suggestion 
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of using the index of all other domestic prices as the 
proxy. 
The most recent analysis of monetary policy on agri­
culture is by Chambers (19 84). He develops a theoretical 
model based on financial and commodity sectors of an economy. 
However, the model is of a short-run nature and not capable 
of addressing long-run outcomes of a policy change. He also 
shows that an expansionary monetary policy may improve the 
competitive position of an exporting-oriented sector in the 
short-run. 
In summary, construction of a theoretically sound model 
of the world market for a given agricultural commodity would 
require the incorporation of the following; 
1. the behavior of all world market participants; 
2. endogenously determined domestic and trade policies 
of all market participants; 
3. all other prices; 
4. endogenously determined exchange rate and freight 
rates ; and 
5. differentiation of the traded commodities by source 
of supply. 
This, of course, is a formidable task and would require a 
large and detailed multi-national, and multi-sectoral model. 
20 
Objectives 
The general concern of this study is the effect of U.S. 
monetary policy on U.S. agricultural exports and U.S. export 
market share through its effect on the exchange rate. Al­
though the theoretical literature in agriculture on this 
topic is expanding, relatively little attention has been 
paid to the instability caused by monetary policies through 
their effect on the exchange rate. In general, multinational 
models have treated the exchange rate as fixed and ignored 
the effects of monetary policy (Thompson, 1981). 
The specific emphasis of this study will be U.S. monetary 
policy and its impacts on the world coarse grain^ market. The 
U.S., as a world banker and a large country, dominates world 
money supply, world inflation, and exchange rate movements 
(Dornbusch, 1980, pp. 140-141), Small countries have only a 
minor effect on world inflation and exchange rates. In 
addition, only a few countries of the western world have 
floating currencies. In June of 1980, for example, only 39 
of the 133 member countries of the International Monetary 
Fund had floating rates. Of those, 9 kept the rates within 
a defined band and some 95 members pegged their currencies 
either to a single other currency (predominantly to the U.S. 
^The definition of "coarse grain" is provided in Appendix 
A. 
21 
dollar) or to the Special Drawing Rights. For this reason, 
the present international monetary system is often called a 
"dirty" or "mixed" floating regime of exchange rates. There­
fore, exchange rate control by a large number of countries, 
after March 19 73, has limited the effects of their monetary 
and fiscal policies on exchange rates. The econometric 
model developed here will, therefore, be a partial equilibrium 
model in that only U.S. monetary policy effects on the world 
coarse grain market will be considered. 
The coarse grain market is used for several reasons. 
First, since the mid-19 60s coarse grain has been the world's 
largest grain commodity in terms of production, consumption, 
and trade (see Wisner and Denbaly, 19 82). Second, coarse 
grain is utilized mainly by the developed nations as a live­
stock feed to meet their increasing demand for meats. This 
helps reduce the size of the model by limiting the number of 
significant participants in the world coarse grain market. 
The United States, Argentina, Canada, Australia, South Africa, 
and Thailand are the six largest exporters of coarse grain. 
Together, they exported around 85% of total world trade in 
1982. The U.S. accounted for 72% of world coarse grain ex­
ports, followed by Argentina which supplied only 9.5%. On 
the importing side, the European Economic Community (EEC), 
Japan, the USSR, Eastern European, and Low-Income Less 
Developed nations are the largest world market participants. 
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The EEC and many other participants, however, can be treated 
as exogenous, because of their effective price insulating 
policies. Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC, for example, 
has not permitted world market signals to penetrate the 
domestic market (Chapter II for details). The remaining 
regions have been relatively small and thus, unimportant. 
Only two world coarse grain trade models exist in the 
literature, neither of which is suitable for the general 
purposes of this study. Bjarnason (1967) used a spatial 
equilibrium model to forecast prices, production, consumption, 
and trade flows for the year 1980. Comparisons of his fore­
casts (see Bjarnason, 1967, p. 220) and actual 1980 data indi­
cate that a large error is generated in forecasting those 
variables, particularly the trade flows. This is not sur­
prising because much has happened since 1967, for which this 
spatial model was not designed. Thompson (19 81) indicates 
that nonspatial equilibrium models are most appropriate to 
explain the interrelationships among trading regions by 
including the structure of the internal demands and supplies, 
government behavior, the competitive structure of the in­
dustry, exchange rates, etc. Collins (1977), used an 
Armington (19 69) type model known as a trade flow and market 
share model of world coarse grain trade. Sarris (1981) 
indicated that Armington type models are not designed to 
answer questions relating to price formation and forecasting. 
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Therefore, Collins model cannot be used to explain (or fore­
cast) the effects of U.S. monetary policy through exchange 
rates on price formation and trade in world coarse grain 
markets. 
The specific objectives of this study include the 
following: 
1. qualitative study of U.S. monetary policy (during 
the 1960-19 80 period) and its general internal and 
external influence; 
2. investigation of the channels through which U.S. 
monetary policy influences agricultural commodity 
markets ; 
3. research of the quantitative characteristics of 
world coarse grain market participants and a descrip­
tion of their historical policies; 
4. conceptualization of a nonspatial world coarse grain 
market model, including specification of demand, 
supply, and inventory equations for countries which 
are important in terms of their quantitative char­
acteristics and historical pricing policies, and 
specification of import/export demand relationships 
for the remaining regions; 
5. validation of the model by (a) historical simulation, 
and (b) stability test. The model's stability is 
measured by its response to a one period exogenous 
shock in the U.S. money supply in 1971; 
6. simulation of the model to analyze the effects of 
an expansionary U.S. monetary policy. Because of 
the move from fixed to flexible exchange rates in 
the early 19 70s, the analysis is performed for the 
decade of the 1970s to assess the impacts of a 
sustained five billion dollar increase in the U.S. 
money supply on the prices, trade, and U.S. produc­
tion, consumption, and inventory of coarse grain. 
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Data Sources 
The majority of the data in this study are published 
by the United States Department of Agriculture. The re­
maining data have been collected from various sources. 
Chapter IV provides the variable names, definitions, units, 
and the sources of the data used. 
The data for the centrally planned economics were 
the most difficult to obtain. The Central Intelligence 
Agency publication Handbook of Economic Indicators was the 
single most useful source for these data. 
The data for the U.S. exchange rate were obtained from 
International Financial Statistics published by the Inter­
national Monetary Fund (Table 4.2 for detailed data sources). 
Organization of this 
Dissertation 
Chapter II reviews the history of U.S. monetary policy 
and the channels through which U.S. monetary policy affects 
commodity markets. Chapter II also describes the supply 
and demand structure of the world coarse grain market, 
including the domestic and trading policies of the regions 
of the model. 
Chapter III includes two subsections. First, the 
general structure of the model is discussed graphically. 
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Second, the mathematical representation of the model in­
cluding the theoretical construction is presented. 
Chapter IV reports the characteristics and properties 
of the model, appropriate estimation procedure, the final 
estimated equations, and the validation results. 
Chapter V is devoted to the simulation results. 
Finally, Chapter VI includes a summary, conclusion, and 
suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II. DESCRIPTION OF U.S. MONETARY POLICY AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL COARSE GRAIN MARKET 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe U.S. monetary 
policy, the world coarse grain market, and their interrela­
tionship as a background to the empirical analysis of the 
effects of monetary policy on trade in the next chapter. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections: 1) the 
process of U.S. monetary policy, its history, and linkage 
to agricultural commodity markets, and 2) the structure of 
the international coarse grain market, with emphasis on the 
domestic and trade policies of the market participants. 
U.S. Monetary Policy 
The U.S. money supply changes in response to actions 
by the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) and government fiscal 
policy. In this section, after considering the various 
sources of changes in U.S. money supply, the transmission 
mechanism of U.S. monetary policy actions to the U.S. ex­
change rate changes and the linkage to agricultural com­
modity markets are explained. 
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Sources of the U.S. money supply 
Monetary policy instruments The FRB can affect the 
level of the money supply in three ways, all operating through 
the reserve requirement mechanism. This mechanism requires 
commercial banks to hold as reserves some fraction of their 
total demand and time deposit liabilities, that is, of their 
customers' total checking and savings account balances. 
First, the reserves can be altered by the FRB's open 
market operations. The decision to buy or sell is made by 
the FRB's open market manager, usually a vice president of 
the FRB of New York, under the supervision of the Open Market 
Committee, composed of the seven FRB presidents. If the FRB 
decides to buy government bonds, it can do so by drawing 
checks on itself. The sellers of the bonds will then deposit 
the checks, drawn on the FRB, in their local banks. These 
checks then become the local banks' claims on the FRB, or 
reserves from the local banks' point of view. Until late 
1979, these types of policies were used by the FRB as a 
policy tool to influence the nominal demand for money 
through its effect on interest rates. 
Second, money supply is affected through what is known 
as the discount window operation. Commercial banks may 
borrow reserves from the FRB at a specified discount rate, 
normally set below the short-term market interest rate—such 
as a treasury bill rate. Like the FRB purchase of bonds. 
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commercial bank reserve borrowing increases the money supply. 
The difference is that open market operation is initiated by 
the government, while the discount window operation is 
initiated by the private sector. 
Third, the FRB can also influence the money supply by 
altering the reserve requirement ratio. A decrease in the 
reserve ratio will enable commercial banks to expand their 
demand deposit liabilities and therefore increase the money 
supply. For details of this process see Beare (1978) . 
These three monetary policies of the FRB are often 
applied in different circumstances to serve different 
purposes. The open market operations are viewed as the 
FRB's daily practice of controlling the money supply 
(Branson, 1979, p. 269). Before 1980, open market operations 
were used to control the interest rates. Currently, however, 
this instrument is used to control the money supply to affect 
the rate of inflation and other economic indicators. The 
discount window operations are basically designed to help 
commercial banks under tight monetary conditions by allowing 
them to borrow reserves from the FRB. Therefore, they are 
defined within the context of overall credit conditions set 
by the FRB. A change in the reserve ratio, however, 
is viewed as a major shift in monetary policy, and is 
therefore, well-publicized by the FRB to serve as a warning 
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signal to the financial community. 
Deficit financing The effects of deficit spending 
on the money supply depend upon the way in which the 
deficit is financed. There are basically four ways through 
which the government can finance a deficit. First, the 
government can sell bonds to either the nonbank public or 
commercial banks. The treasury deals directly with the 
private sector; consequently, this has no effect on either 
reserves or the money supply. Second, the government can 
sell the bonds to the FRB in exchange for deposits. As a 
result, the money supply increases because the treasury 
spends these funds by transferring the deposits to the 
public, who then transfers them to their banks in exchange 
for demand deposits. Third, the treasury can finance the 
deficit by using up its demand deposits in the commercial 
banks. Because the demand deposits held by the government 
are not counted as part of the money supply, this method of 
deficit financing also increases the money supply. Finally, 
the treasury can use its deposits with the FRB which will 
also increase the money supply. 
The unwillingness of the U.S. to tax itself to finance 
the Vietnam war led to an increasing budget deficit as the 
government sold bonds. Consequently, the U.S. money supply 
also began to increase, putting a strain on the dollar-gold 
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par value, supported by the U.S. under the Bretton-Woods 
arrangement, and, therefore, on the international monetary 
system. Furthermore, through its effect on the money 
supply, deficit spending has had a greater impact on the 
exchange rate, with the beginning of floating exchange 
rates. 
The U.S. government has attempted to affect (and control) 
the rate of growth of aggregate demand through its demand-
management-type macroeconomic policies since World War 11.^ 
The macroeconomic policies affect aggregate demand in two 
stages. For example, an increase in the real money supply 
first generates a portfolio disequilibrium in the money 
market. That is, at the prevailing interest rate and level 
of income people are holding more money than they want. 
This causes portfolio holders to attempt to reduce their 
money holdings by buying other assets; the change in the 
money supply changes interest rates. In the second stage, 
the change in interest rates affects aggregate demand. 
^The ultimate goal has been to manage the rates of 
unemployment and inflation* 
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History of U.S. monetary policy; 1960-1980^ 
The term "New Economics" has been used to describe the 
analytical and philosophical approach to economic policy­
making during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations in the 
1960s (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1981). The philosophy has come to 
be known as one of the most activist and optimistic approaches 
to economics. It is well-characterized by Walter Heller 
(1967): 
The significance of the great expansion in the 60's 
lies not only in its striking statistics of employ­
ment, income, and growth but in its glowing promise 
of things to come. If we can surmount the economic 
pressures of Vietnam without later being trapped into 
a continuing war on inflation when we should be 
fighting economic slack, the "new economics" can move 
us steadily toward the qualitative goals that lie 
beyond the facts and figures of affluence. 
The first major economic policy action taken by the 
Kennedy-Johnson administration was the 1964 tax cut. The 
20 to 91 percent marginal tax rates for individuals were 
cut to 14 to 70 percent. Similarly, the corporate tax 
rate was reduced from 52 to 48 percent (Heller, 1967, pp. 61-
70). The total tax cut was estimated to be 13 billion 
dollars. The vigorous expansion in economic activity set 
off by the 1964 tax cut and supported by accompanying monetary 
A more detailed analysis of macroeconomic policy ac­
tions and their impacts upon the macroeconomy can be found 
in Dornbush (1981) , from which this summary has benefited. 
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expansion led to a significant increase in inflation by 
1965-66.^ Inflation rose from an annual rate of 1.0 to 1.5 
percent during 1961-64 to about 2.9 to 5.4 percent during 
1966-69. Unemployment fell to 4 percent by early 1966, 
and the economy was operating at a high level of GNP. 
The high inflation rate led to a restrictive monetary 
policy that produced the credit crunch of late 1966. The 
money supply stayed constant for the last three quarters 
of 1966 from a 4.5 percent rate of growth in early 1966. 
The reduction in the growth rate of money supply was the 
result of not only a reduction in the rate of growth of high-
powered (base) money but also an increased reserve require­
ment on time deposits. At the same time. Regulation Q im­
posed a ceiling on interest rates that banks are allowed to 
pay on their time deposits. As the credit crunch pushed up 
nominal interest rates rapidly, commercial banks found them­
selves incapable of raising funds because the public pre­
ferred other assets yielding higher returns than the regu­
lated time deposits. The consequent tightness of the 
monetary supply affected aggregate demand, particularly 
residential construction, and was reflected in the real 
aggregate output reduction of the U.S. in late 1966 and 
early 1967. 
^All rates of growth of money supply used in this 
section are on a December to December basis. 
33 
The "minirecession" of 1966 (Dornbusch and Fischer, 
19 81) was followed by large military spending, in addition to 
highly expansionary monetary policy during 1968-69. The rate 
of growth of the money supply increased from 2.2 percent in 
1966 to around 7 percent during 1967-68. As a result, infla­
tion increased from 3 percent in 1967 to 4.7 percent by late 
196 8. Dornbusch and Fischer (19 81) give two reasons for this 
highly expansionary policy. First, the FRB was attempting 
to avoid a repetition of the credit crunch. Second, the 
effects of the 1968 tax surcharge in reducing aggregate 
demand were overestimated. The surcharge was designed to 
offset the large expansionary effects of the sizeable de­
fense spending during 1965-67, which was coupled with no 
expansionary monetary policy. In other words, the high 
level of employment combined with the increasing rate of in­
flation in 1967 led to the 1968 tax increase to offset the 
expansionary effects of high levels of government spending. 
In 1969, in an effort to reduce inflation, which 
reached an annual rate of about 5.0 percent a year, the rate 
of growth of the money supply and government deficit expendi­
ture were reduced. The result was the 1969-7 0 recession and 
a reduction in real output. In 19 72, while a system of 
price and wage controls was in effect, the money supply and 
government deficit spending were increased. The money supply 
growth was increased to 9.3 percent, leading to an increase 
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in aggregate demand and, therefore, real output. Between 
1972 and 1974, money supply growth was reduced from 9.3 to 
4.4 percent a year, leading to the longest and most severe 
economic contraction of the post-war period (Starleaf, 1982). 
The real output of the economy rose again between 1975-1978 
for at least two reasons: 1) the 19 76 tax cut recommended 
by the Ford administration and 2) a substantial increase in 
the rate of growth of the money supply. From about 5.0 per­
cent in 1975, the annual rate of growth in the money supply 
increased to 8.3 percent in 1978. As mentioned earlier, how­
ever, the Federal Reserve authorities adopted a tight mone­
tary policy in 1979, which ended in 1982. The December-to-
December Ml money stock was reduced from 8.3 in 19 76 to 5.6 
percent in 1981. According to Starleaf (1982): 
This is the major causal factor for the business 
cycle contraction of 1980 and for the cyclical 
contraction which began in July 1981. 
As is evident, monetary policy has been used by 
policy-makers to influence the rates of inflation and un­
employment. In the first section of this chapter, 
processes of altering money supply were discussed. Then, 
the recent history of U.S. monetary policy was discussed. 
The following section is a discussion of the links between 
monetary policy and agricultural commodity markets . 
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Monetary policy and the agricultural commodity markets 
Starleaf (1982) illustrates that the impacts of monetary 
policy on commodity markets are realized through both foreign 
and domestic channels. Each of these will be discussed 
in turn. 
The extent of the impact of the monetary policy on com­
modity markets through foreign channels depends upon the 
prevailing international monetary system. Under the Gold-
Standard and the Bretton-Woods systems, the United States was 
committed to preserving the price of gold, while other 
currencies were linked to the U.S. dollar. With weak inter­
national financial capital markets, this meant that as the 
U.S. money supply increased, the commitment to preserve the 
gold-dollar par value eventually became impossible. This was 
because the U.S. gold stocks were becoming unmatchable to 
the stock of U.S. dollars at the fixed dollar price of gold, 
especially when other currencies were indirectly fixed to the 
gold price in terms of the dollar. Consequently, in 1973, 
after two devaluations, the Nixon administration broke away 
from the Bretton-Woods system. By this time, the funda­
mental idea of the monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination was established: an exchange rate, like the 
price of any commodity, changes as the total excess demand 
(demand minus supply) for the currency changes. Therefore, 
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it was evident that exchange rates were a monetary phenomenon 
and even more importantly, that monetary policy independency 
was at stake if the fixed exchange rate regime was to be kept. 
Under the Purchasing Power Parity doctrine, inflation 
is easily transmitted among countries under a fixed exchange 
rate system. Therefore, changes in the money supply of a 
country, given other variables, left the relative prices un­
changed. This meant that under the fixed exchange rates, 
U.S. monetary policy did not affect the effective foreign 
demand for the industries active in trading. However, a 
monetary policy did profoundly affect the nontradable goods 
industries and the production of the trade sectors through 
its impact on internal interest rates. 
The almost simultaneous evolution of the internationally 
integrated mobile capital markets and the (dirty) floating 
exchange rate regime dramatically changed the picture. 
The floating exchange rate regime was suggested by Schuh 
(1979) to be an important source of instability in the 
trading sectors of an economy. The flexible exchange rate 
system allows different rates of inflation to exist through­
out the world. At the same time, under this system, monetary 
policy translates into exchange rate movements, particularly 
when capital is mobile. For example, a monetary expansion 
policy puts downward pressure on interest rates causing a 
capital outflow which ends when interest rates are equalized 
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among countries. As a result of the outflow, the value of 
the domestic currency in international capital markets 
declines. The depreciation of the domestic currency makes 
imports decline while providing a stimulus to exports. The 
demand for domestic output would consequently increase, and 
adjustments in the trade sectors would be the means by which 
authorities achieve their goals. The external impacts of 
domestic monetary policy on the agricultural prices and 
exports are documented by Chambers and Just (1982). 
Under flexible exchange rates, the external balance, 
i.e., the balance-of-payments, clears by adjustments in 
exchange rates. This self-correcting mechanism of the 
balance-of-payments provided a great deal of independence in 
terms of the monetary policies of trading countries. As a 
result, since the switch to flexible rates, the world money 
supply has dramatically increased. Individual countries 
wishing to increase their rates of employment and growth 
found monetary policy an effective tool under the floating 
rates. McKinnon (1982) and Frankel and Johnson (1976) 
have argued that the U.S. and world bouts of inflation and 
recession are better explained by wide swings in world money 
supply than they are by movements in aggregate domestic 
supply alone. 
As noted earlier, the external impact of monetary policy 
under flexible rates is greatly enhanced, while the impact 
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under the fixed rates is purely domestic. However, the do­
mestic impacts of monetary policy under both regimes are pro­
found. Starleaf (1982) documented the internal impact of 
monetary policy on agriculture. He showed that the annual 
variability of real and nominal output of the nonfood sector 
of the U.S. economy for the period 1948-81 were parallel. 
However, this was not the case for the food sector during the 
same time period. To quantify this impression, Starleaf used 
the standard deviations of nominal and real annual output 
changes for both sectors. In the nonfood sector, the stan­
dard deviations of annual percentage changes were 3.8% and 
3.2% for nominal and real, respectively. At the same time, 
the standard deviations of nominal and real annual food 
sector output percentage changes, were 12.8% and 3.7%, re­
spectively. These results, of course, are not surprising be­
cause agricultural supplies for each period are determined by 
the decisions made in the previous period and, therefore, are 
fixed at the beginning of each period. What is interesting, 
however, is that any time monetary policy was used to improve 
employment or to reduce inflation, nominal agricultural prices 
reacted dramatically. This occurred because the real output of 
the nonfood sector (unlike the food sector) was price elastic 
and, thus, reacted quickly putting upward pressure on the 
prices of the fixed agricultural supply of that period. Star-
leaf believes that the adoption of a tight money policy in late 
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1978 or early 1979, which ended in 1982, resulted in the 
business cycle contractions since 1980. 
Until 1979, the FRB followed a demand-oriented monetary 
policy through the bonds market, using open market operations. 
Today, however, the main FRB objective is to control the sup­
ply of money. Given the growing deregulation of the U.S. 
credit and banking systems, the agricultural sector as a 
whole will be even more sensitive to monetary policy. As was 
illustrated, the effects of monetary policy through its ef­
fect on the exchange rate is quite different under different 
exchange rate regimes. In a later chapter, a model of the 
U.S. exchange rate is constructed as part of a world coarse 
grain market to account for the changes in the supply of 
money. In other words, an attempt is made to isolate that 
portion of the instability in the world coarse grain market 
that has been caused by freely fluctuating exchange rates. 
Exchange rate fluctuations, as a monetary phenomenon, 
can be explained via the money market and Purchasing Power 
Parity doctrine. This means that not only money supply but 
also real money demand influence the exchange rate. In the 
absence of tariffs, transport costs, an exchange rate 
equates the prices of traded goods in alternative currencies 
as follows: 
P = eP* (1) 
where P and P* represent the domestic and foreign currency 
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prices of traded goods, respectively, and where e is the 
domestic currency price of foreign exchange.^ Equation 1 
can be solved for the exchange rate in terms of price 
levels : 
® = I*- (2) 
To link the exchange rate to the monetary sector, money 
market equilibrium conditions of both countries are needed: 
MS = P-L(r, Y) (3) 
MS* = P*-L*(r*, Y*) (4) 
where MS and MS* represent the domestic and foreign nominal 
money supply, L and L* represent the domestic and foreign 
real demand for money which are functions of the relevant 
country's interest rate (r or r*), and real income (Y or 
Y*) . 
By solving for P and P* from (3) and (4) and substi­
tuting into Equation 2, the equilibrium exchange rate can 
be expressed as; 
®  ^  '  i r  ( 5 )  
^Variables with asterisks refer to a foreign country. 
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The rate of change in the equilibrium exchange rate can then 
be expressed as: 
(  +  )  ( - )  (  +  )  ( - )  
ê = (MS - MS*) + (L*-L) (6) 
The first term in (6) represents the effects of nominal 
money supply changes on the exchange rate. Given other vari­
ables, it implies that an increase in the growth rate of nomi­
nal money supply in either one of the two countries will have 
a depreciating effect on its currency. 
The second term in (6) captures the effects of changes 
in real money demand. Other variables constant, an increase 
in the growth rate of real money demand in either one of the 
two countries will have an appreciating effect on its 
currency. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an analysis 
of the international coarse grain market, the importance of 
the active participants, and their relevant domestic and 
trading policies. 
International Coarse Grain 
Market 
In order to capture the economic behavior of the world 
coarse grain market in an econometric model, the structure 
of the market and the interaction among market participants 
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must be analyzed. Many studies in the area of agricultural 
trade have emphasized the influence of domestic agricultural 
policies on international market behavior. McCalla and Josling 
(19 81), for example, emphasized the interaction of policy-
determined (not market-determined) excess demand and supplies 
of all participants in trade. They concluded that the inter­
national market in grains is the interaction of policy-in­
duced residuals from national markets, and that the principal 
objective of most domestic policies is to export domestic 
instability. 
It is often argued that the U.S. dominates international 
grain markets as a price leader. Harrison (1980) , for example, 
states that the U.S. sets the world prices through its domestic 
pricing policies and by acting as the residual supplier. 
Other exporters have operated in their own best interests 
within that environment.^ He further argues that the net 
effect has been an oligopolistically competitive structure 
with U.S. price leadership and market sharing among other 
supporters. Paarlberg (1980) wrote: 
We pursued policies that made us unfortunately the 
residual supplier in world markets. We held our ex­
port prices above world levels. Other exporters 
priced their products a cent or two under ours and 
sold their supplies. Buyers would purchase these 
bargain products first, then turn to the United 
States to round out their needs. 
^For a full explanation of the "residual supplier" argu­
ment see Hillman (1981) . 
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One analytical and two empirical articles have con­
sidered the role of the U.S. as a residual supplier in the 
international coarse grain market. McCalla (1967) postu­
lated a theoretical model of coarse grain trade influenced 
by the domestic policies of major importers and exporters. 
He argued that the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation's stock 
acquisition and dispersal policies set the price in the world 
market and that the United States can be considered the 
residual supplier in the world market. 
Using a dominant-firm, price leadership empirical model, 
MacGregor and Kulshreshta (1980) conclude that the U.S. 
coarse grain demand curve consists of the residual of the 
world import demand left after small exporting countries sell 
all they want. In addition, they state that the U.S. would 
maximize its export revenues by restricting marketings. 
Bredahl and Green (19 83) also empirically explore the 
United States' role as a residual supplier in the world coarse 
grain market. Using the Granger-Sims Causality Test, they 
conclude that the hypothesized role of the United States as a 
residual supplier requires that coarse grain exports of com­
peting exporters have not responded to world prices. They 
showed not only that the excess supplies of the competing 
exporters are price inelastic, but also that U.S. coarse 
grain exports and world prices are simultaneously determined. 
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For the purpose of the present study, the U.S. will be 
treated as the residual world supplier in the coarse grain 
market. However, because it is likely that a certain degree 
of price transmission would occur, prices will be linked 
among exporting and importing countries through a set of 
price transmission equations. 
Regional breakdown of countries 
Exporting regions Although there are well over a 
hundred countries that import coarse grains, there are only 
a handful of world exporters. The United States, Argentina, 
Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Thailand accounted for 
over 85% of the world's total coarse grain exports in 1982. 
Since 1972, the United States, consistently the largest 
exporter of coarse grains, has accounted for over 60% of 
total world exports, while the other five have accounted 
for about 25% of the world coarse grain exports. 
Importing regions To reduce the number of importing 
countries in the analysis to a more manageable number, some 
classification system is normally used. Geographic and 
economic classifications are the two most commonly used 
divisions. However, as Schmitz et al. (1981) indicate, simi­
larities in market behavior and response must be used as the 
criteria for effective classification in economic analyses. 
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The importing regions range widely in size, per capita income, 
and international liquidity. This study uses the widely 
adopted tripartite classification, i.e., developed (DC), de­
veloping (LDC), and centrally-planned (CP) economies (see 
Appendix A). However, for the analysis of U.S. monetary 
policy impact on trade and prices, the diverse triparite 
aggregation does not quite suffice. The effect of change 
in exchange rates, as well as other variables, is to either 
shift or rotate the excess demand or supply schedule faced 
by an individual country. Hence, aggregation over a large 
number of countries does not allow taking account of such 
shifts explicitly. Following Schmitz et al. (1981), the 
criteria used in grouping importing nations are the simi­
larities in price response, government policies, production, 
and export ability. 
Developed countries (DC) are all high income countries. 
However, significant policy differences exist. Within the 
DC category there are three subdivisions: the European 
Economic Community (EEC), the remainder of Western Europe 
(OWE), and Japan. OWE pursues domestic policies similar to 
the EEC with its Common Agricultural Policy. Because the 
EEC and OWE have successfully insulated their domestic 
agricultural markets from the world market, they will 
be treated as an exogenous part of the model. Japan is treated 
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as a separate region because it relies almost entirely on 
foreign sources of feed grains and is a relatively large im­
porter. 
The centrally planned countries are subdivided into the 
USSR, China (PRC), and Eastern Europe (EE). The USSR and 
China are considered as two separate regions because of the 
size of their production and trade. Vietnam, Cuba, North 
Korea, Cambodia, and Laos are included in the Developing 
Economies (LDC) category. This is because their import 
demand characteristics and responses resemble those of low-
income nations with foreign exchange limitations. 
To further divide the remaining countries, the criteria 
used by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
for long-term projections is applied. The two major in­
fluencing factors in imports of commercial goods include 
per capita income and foreign-exchange-earning abilities 
of the countries. Using this criteria, LDCs are divided into 
two subregions; the rapidly developing nations (LDCR) and 
the moderately developing countries (LDCM), The LDCR have an 
annual per capita income of at least $300. This subregion 
is further divided into OPEC and non-OPEC (NONOPEC) countries. 
The LDCM have a per capita GNP of less than $300. Note that 
the five centrally planned countries excluded from the CP 
category are included in LDCM. For a detailed breakdown 
see Appendix A. 
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Quantitative characteristics and policies of the regions 
International trade in grains has grown rapidly over 
the post-war period. This has been accompanied by signifi­
cant changes in market structure. Increasingly fewer ex­
porters provide grain to a growing and diverse set of im­
porters. Trade has been heavily influenced by the decisions 
of national governments. This section first focuses on the 
key quantitative characteristics of the coarse grain market 
such as exports, imports, and market shares. Then the 
policies of the major participants will be considered. 
Both in volume and value, coarse grain is the largest 
world production aggregate. World coarse grain production in­
creased 62 percent over the twenty-one year period of 1960 
to 1980 although the harvested area increased by less than 
8 percent. A 56 percent growth in yields (1.6 to 2.5 tons 
per hectare) accounts for most of the increase. Trade rose 
rapidly over this period, mainly reflecting rapid increases 
in livestock feeding by importing, developed countries. The 
nearly 440 percent increase in trade between 1960 and 1980 
resulted in an increase in the proportion of world production 
traded from 6 to 14 percent (Table 2.1). 
Degree of international market dependence Exporters' 
dependence on the international coarse grain market is vari­
able. Thailand exports virtually all of its coarse grain 
Table 2.1. World grain^ production and trade. 1960/61 - 1980/81^ 
June-July 
Trade Years 
Coarse Grain Total Grains 
Production Trade 
Area 














1966-67 522.0 40.0 270.3 1.93 1,004 104 
1971-72 629.6 49.0 280.9 2.23 1,193 110 
1976-77 704.4 82.5 300.1 2.34 1,360 156 
1978-79 753.3 90.2 299.7 2.51 1,460 174 
1979-80 741.4 100.9 291.9 2.54 1,418 200 
1980-81 730.1 105.7 282.9 2.58 1,435 212 
^Includes coarse grain, wheat and rice. 
^Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, 
Foreign Agricultural Circular Grains, FG 1-82, Jan. 20, 1982; FG 22-82, July 16, 
1982; FG 18-78, Nov. 13, 1978; FG 12-73, Oct. 26, 1973. 
49 
production. Australia, Argentina, and South Africa export 
in the neighborhood of 50% of their production, while 
Canada exports less than 20% of its production. The portion 
of U.S. production exported has steadily increased to 
over 25% (Table 2.2). The domestic market in the United 
States, however, remains the primary production outlet. 
On the import side, the dependence of the EEC on the 
world markets for coarse grain supplies has declined to 
less than 20% of their consumption in most years. Japan 
is almost completely dependent on imports. When all importing 
developed nations are considered, a fairly stable level of 25% 
of consumption imported is evident. The USSR has become a 
significant net importer, and Eastern Europe's dependence 
on international supplies has increased to over 10% of their 
consumption. Coarse grain exports to LDCs are imported 
mainly by the rapidly developing nations (LDCR), i.e., OPEC 
and NONOPEC regions. The dependence of LDCR on the inter­
national market is steadily growing (see Table 2.2). 
Exports and export market shares The market share 
data reveal the degree of concentration of grain-exporting 
countries. The data show that most of the coarse grain ex­
ports are under the control of only one country, the U.S. 
This emphasizes the dominant role of the U.S. as discussed 
earlier. 
Table 2.2. Degree of dependence of international coarse grain market, 1960-1980^ 
Exporters Importers 
Net Exports as Percent of Production Net Imports as Percent of Total Consumption 
Year USA Exporter-4^ Exporter-6^ EEC9 Japan DC^ USSR 
eastern 
Europe LDCRC 
1960 7.6 9.3 10.3 23.4 43.2 23.5 -3.4^ -.4 1.8 
1961 11.6 13.5 15.0 28.5 52.1 27.2 -5.7 3.3 1.8 
1962 11.6 12.7 14.4 28.7 58.0 30.0 —4 .6 3.8 1.3 
1963 11.7 13.9 14.7 25.3 83.6 28.8 -4.0 5.0 1.1 
1964 15.7 16.8 17.1 24.5 78.5 28.5 -3.0 2.8 -3.6 
1965 17.6 19.0 19.2 29.1 78.8 33.6 -4.2 6.2 -4.0 
1966 13.7 14.9 16.4 25.8 84.7 32.7 -1.0 0.6 -3.7 
1967 12.5 13.8 15.5 23.6 87.5 30.1 -1.0 0.9 -4.2 
1968 9.7 12.0 12.4 19.0 88.5 26.7 -1.0 2.6 -1.0 
1969 11.5 14.5 15.2 17.5 93.5 27.0 -1.4 3.2 -0.8 
1970 12.4 18.3 19.7 23.5 94.6 31.0 -1.1 6.1 1.5 
1971 12.6 15.0 16.7 17.1 91.1 25.3 4.6 8.9 6.1 
1972 21.0 23.0 22.9 17.2 100.8 27.6 8.6 3.8 12.7 
1973 21.6 23.2 23.4 17.3 102.2 26.9 5.5 4.3 9.0 
1974 23.5 25.1 26.3 19.0 98.5 26.1 1.8 9.2 12.5 
1975 26.8 29.2 29.5 18.4 95.8 25.8 18.7 10.1 11.2 
1976 25.9 28.2 28.7 30.7 101.2 35.2 3.3 11.6 14.3 
1977 27.5 29.2 29.3 14.3 101.2 26.8 10.1 11.0 22.6 
1978 27.5 30.0 30.7 12.4 100.1 25.6 8.1 16.8 22.6 
1979 29.9 33.5 33.1 12.1 100.3 25.2 18.8 15.9 21.7 
1980 35.0 39.9 40.0 12.9 100.4 25.9 18.6 17.3 23.4 
^Source: Schmitz et al., 1981, p. 66. 
^Exporter-4 includes U.S.A., Argentina, Canada, and Australia; Exporter-6 in­
cludes South Africa and Thailand in addition to the above four exporters. 
DC and LDCR stand for developed regions and rapidly developing nations, 
respectively. 
^A minus sign (-) indicates net exports. 
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Table 2.3 shows the actual coarse grain exports as 
well as the market shares of the United States, the four 
largest and the six largest coarse grain exporters.^ Trade 
in coarse grain quadrupled over the twenty-one year period of 
1960-1980. The United States increased its dominance of the 
market as indicated by the increase in its export market 
share from 40 to 60%. None of the other exporters' shares of 
exports approached that of the U.S. In order of descending 
importance, they include Argentina, Canada, Australia, 
South Africa, and Thailand. The first three account for be­
tween 15 to 20 percent of the market, and the remaining 
account for about 6 percent of the market. The four largest 
exporters account for about 75 percent of the market, while 
the six largest account for over 80 percent. Particularly 
important, though, is the growing dominance of the United 
States, a fact significant enough to help explain the residual 
supplier behavior of the U.S. in the international coarse 
grain market. 
Importers and import market shares Table 2.4 indi­
cates that imports have increased rapidly over the last two 
decades. Almost all increases in DC imports took place in the 
^The term "the four largest" refers to the U.S., Argen­
tina, Canada, and Australia which is labeled as Exporter-4. 
The six largest exporters are Exporter-4, South Africa and 
Thailand, labeled as Exporter-6. 




Actual Exports (million metric tons) Market Shares (Percent) 
Total 
Gross South 
Year Exports USA Canada Australia Argentina Thailand Africa USA Exporters-4 Exporters-6 
1960 26.1 11.2 1.0 1.3 2.6 0.5 1.7 42.9 61.7 70.1 
1961 33.8 15.2 1.0 0.8 3.9 0.6 2.6 45.0 . 61.8 71.3 
1962 32.6 15.2 0.9 0.6 3.3 0.7 2.8 46.7 61.5 72.3 
1963 36.1 16.6 1.3 0.6 5.2 0.9 1.2 46,0 65.6 71.5 
1964 37.9 19.6 1.1 0.7 3.7 0.9 0.7 51.7 66.2 70.4 
1965 47.4 25.7 1.2 0.7 5,5 1.2 0,5 54.2 69.8 73.4 
1966 43.1 20.1 1.3 0.7 4,8 1.3 3,0 46.6 64.0 74.0 
1967 44.5 20.7 1.0 0.5 4.7 1,3 2.9 46.5 60.4 69.9 
1968 39.7 16.3 0.6 0.9 5.5 1.3 0.8 41.0 58.7 64.0 
1969 47.1 18,9 1.7 1.2 7,4 1.6 1.2 40.1 62.0 67.9 
1970 53.4 18.6 4.3 2.9 8,8 1.7 2,9 34.8 64.8 73.4 
1971 55.5 24.1 4.9 2.8 2.7 2.2 3.7 43.4 62.1 72.8 
1972 69.0 38.7 3.9 1.4 7.9 1.1 0.2 56.1 75.2 77.1 
1973 81.1 40.7 2.7 2.5 9,1 2.3 3.4 51.9 69.1 77.2 
1974 69.2 35.9 3.2 2.8 5.9 2.2 3.4 51.9 69,1 77.2 
1975 88.2 50.0 5.0 3.6 6.9 2.6 1.5 56.7 74,3 78.9 
1976 88.5 50.6 4.4 2.7 9.6 2.3 2.6 37.2 76.1 81.2 
1977 95.0 56.2 4.0 1.6 10.9 1.3 3.4 59.1 76.5 81.4 
1978 99.4 60.2 3.9 4.0 9.5 2,2 2,4 60.1 78.1 82.7 
1979 100.2 62.1 3.9 3.0 11.6 4.9 2.9 61.9 80.4 88.2 
1980 104.1 71.1 4.9 4.4 6.9 5,0 2.9 68.3 83.8 91.4 
^Source : See Table 2.2. 
a 
Table 2.4. Actual coarse grain imports (million metric tons) anij market shares, 1960-80 
Import 
Other Shares 
Year EEC9 Japan 
Western 
Europe Dcf USSR 
Eastern 
Europe China CP° OPEC NONOPEC LDCM^ 
World 
Imports ; DC CP LDC 
1960 14.4 1.9 2.2 18.9 0.2 1.7 0.7 2.5 0.6 1.0 1.6 23.8 79.4 10.5 6.7 
1961 18.3 2.4 2.0 23.1 0.0 2.9 1.2 4.1 0.8 1.9 2.7 30.9 74.8 13.3 8.7 
1962 18.3 2.9 3.3 24.9 0.0 2.9 0.4 3.3 1.3 1.4 2.7 31.6 78.8 10.4 8.5 
1963 19.1 4.6 3.8 28.9 0.1 3.8 0.8 4.7 0.7 1.7 2.4 35.8 78.2 13.1 6.7 
1964 19.1 5.1 3.7 28.4 0.0 2.6 0.3 2.9 0.8 1,3 2.1 34.3 82.8 8.4 6.1 
1965 23.4 5,2 5.6 34.6 0.0 3.9 0.1 3.9 0.5 2.7 3.2 42.8 80.8 9.1 7.5 
1966 22.2 7.2 5.8 35.8 0.2 2.0 0.1 2.2 0.6 3.8 4.4 43.2 82.9 5.1 10.2 
1967 21.7 7.7 5.1 35.2 0.4 2.5 0.1 2.9 1.1 0.1 4.2 43.3 81.3 6.7 9.7 
1968 19.8 8.5 4.7 33.6 0.5 2.7 0.0 3.2 1.5 1.5 3.0 41.3 81.4 7.7 7.3 
1969 20.1 10.1 4.7 35.6 0.1 2.9 0.0 3.0 2.2 2.0 4.2 43.7 81.5 6.9 9.6 
1970 24.1 10.5 5.0 40.3 0.3 3.6 0.0 3.9 2.3 2.0 4.3 49.9 82.2 8.0 8.8 
1971 22.7 10.3 5.0 38.8 4.3 5.9 0.4 10.6 3.5 2.1 5.6 57.7 69.7 19.0 10.1 
1972 23.2 12.0 6.1 42.2 6.9 4.2 0.9 12.1 5.8 3.3 9.1 64.8 65.1 18.7 14.0 
1973 26.8 14.1 8.5 50.4 6.5 5.1 2.1 13.7 5.5 4.6 10,1 75.9 66.4 18.0 13.3 
1974 25.0 13.1 8.4 47.6 2.7 6.6 0.5 9.8 6.9 3.6 10.5 69.5 68.5 14.1 15,1 
1975 25.9 13.5 7.7 48.2 15.6 8.8 0.0 24.3 7.1 3.8 10.9 84.7 56.9 28.7 12.9 
1976 31.7 15.8 8.8 57.5 5.7 8.9 0.0 14.6 9.0 3.9 12.9 86.1 66.8 17.0 15.0 
1977 23.8 16.9 10.2 52.0 11.7 8.7 0.1 20.4 12.2 4.6 16.8 90.0 57.9 22.6 18.6 
1978 23.8 17.8 9.3 51.2 10.0 10.9 3.1 23.9 13,4 4.6 10.0 94.1 54.4 25.4 19.1 
1979 21.3 17.9 13.6 52.9 18.4 11.4 2.0 31.8 13.5 4.2 9.8 95.8 55.2 33.2 20.2 
1980 19.5 18.9 12.2 50.6 18.0 10.6 0.9 29.5 17.5 5.7 8.3 101.2 51.1 29.2 22.4 
^Source: See Table 2.2. 
Developed regions. 
^Centrally planned economies. 
"^Moderately developing nations. 
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1960s. In the 1970s, however, rapid increases in imports 
occurred in CP and LDC countries. Figure 2.1 illustrates 
the relative import levels of the DC, CP, and LDC countries. 
The most rapid increase in coarse grain imports has taken 
place in Japan, followed by OWE, while imports into the EEC 
have been more unstable and have exhibited less rapid 
growth. Figure 2.2 illustrates the relative import levels 
of the EEC, OWE, and Japan. 
Figure 2.3 depicts the rapid rate of CP import growth. Al­
most all the growth took place during the 1970s. Eastern Europe 
and the USSR primarily have been responsible for this growth 
although the imports by these countries have grown sporadically. 
China is an insignificant force in the coarse grain market. 
Similarly, LDC regions imports grew faster during the 
1970s than in the 1960s (Figure 2.4). The NONOPEC region 
was the principal source of the LDC growth in coarse grain 
imports during the 1970s, particularly those not experiencing 
foreign exchange problems—South Korea and Taiwan. OPEC 
imports have also been growing, but at a smaller rate than the 
LDCMs. The imports to NONOPEC are relatively small and in­
significant during the 1960s. 
Table 2.4 indicates that because of the reductions in 
the rate of growth of EEC imports, the DC market share of 
imports declined to 54% in 1978 (from 79% in 1960). But the 
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Figure 2.2. Coarse grain imports, developed countries, 









Figure 2.3. Coarse grain imports, centrally planned 













Figure 2.4. Coarse grain imports, LDCs, 1960-1980 (see 
Table 2.2) 
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CP market share has risen since 1966 to almost a quarter of 
the market. The LDC regions' market share has also increased 
to over 15%. The quantitative characteristics above use 
gross data figures. In this sense, it double counts regions 
that both export and import. However, in the coarse grain 
market these differences are rather small (see Table 2.5), 
leading to the same conclusions as from using gross figures. 
Historical regional policies and their implications 
Agricultural policies explain much of the recent be­
havior of the international coarse grain market. Some 
regions have effectively isolated themselves from the world 
market through their policies. An historical description of 
the regions policies together with the information in the 
previous section will help to identify the sources of market 
behavior and instability. 
United States Paarlberg (1980) and Cochrane (1979) 
indicate that U.S. domestic coarse grain policies have empha­
sized farm income maintenance and price stability. Further­
more, they indicate that the policy instruments used to 
achieve this goal have included stock acquisition and volun­
tary acreage controls. McCalla (1967) suggests that while 
stock policy influenced the price in any given year, the area 
control programs in conjunction with income payments were the 
major influence over time on prices. The Commodity Credit 
Table 2.5. Net exports and imports by region-coarse grain, 1950-1980 (million metric tons) 
Year USA Exporters-6 
DC^ 
Importers 
EEC^ Japan CP^ USSR 
Eastern 
Europe 
LDC^ LDCR^ LDCM^ 
1960 10.8 17.0 
h 
-14.4 -11.8 -1.9 0.9 1.8 -0.6 0.3 -0.5 0.8 
1961 14.8 22.9 -16.6 -15.0 -2.4 0.6 3.0 -1.3 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 
1962 15.1 22.7 -19.1 -15.6 -2,9 0.7 2.5 -1.5 0.1 -0.4 0.5 
1963 16.4 25.0 -22.1 -14.8 -4.6 -0.9 1.9 -1.7 0,3 -0.3 0.6 
1964 19.2 25.7 -22.8 -14.4 -5.1 0.3 1.6 -1.9 1.7 1.1 0.6 
1965 25.4 33.9 -28.3 -17.8 -5.2 -0,3 2.2 -1.7 1.0 1.3 0.3 
1966 19.8 30.4 -26.2 -16.0 -7.2 0,4 0.6 -0.3 -0.5 1.2 1.7 
1967 20.4 30.1 -25.5 -15.6 -7.7 0,1 0.6 -0.4 0.8 1,4 0.6 
1968 16.0 23.9 -24.8 -12,1 -8.5 -0.6 0.6 -0.8 1.5 0,4 1.1 
1969 18.6 31.1 -25.1 -11.5 -10.0 -0.5 1.0 -1.6 -0.8 0,3 0,5 
1970 18.2 38.6 -28.2 -15.6 -10.5 -2.0 0.8 -2.9 -0.3 -0.6 0,3 
1971 23.8 40.0 -23.1 -11.9 -10.3 -8.7 -3.4 -4.9 -2,1 -2.6 0.5 
1972 38.3 51.9 -30.0 -12.3 -12.0 -9.7 -6.6 -2.2 -1.1 -5.3 -0.8 
1973 40.4 6.6 -32.8 -13.0 -14.1 -10.0 -6.0 -2.4 -5.1 -3.9 -1.2 
1974 35.4 51.9 -32.3 -13.9 -13.1 -7.8 -1.7 -5.6 -6.6 -5.7 -0.9 
1975 49.6 68.5 -33.7 -13.5 -13.5 -21.8 -15.5 -6.4 -5.7 -5.6 0.1 
1976 50.3 71.2 -44.7 -22.2 -15.8 -11.1 -3.7 -7.4 -8.1 -7.6 -0.5 
1977 56.0 76.3 -34.8 -10.4 -16.9 -13.8 -10.7 -7.0 -14.4 -12.2 -2.4 
1978 59.9 81.2 -34.5 -9.7 -17.8 -21.7 -8.9 -9.7 -15.5 -13.7 -1,8 
1979 71.3 96.9 -35.7 -8.1 -17.1 -29.3 -18.4 -9.9 -15.2 -13.5 -1.7 
1980 69.3 99.6 -34.4 —6.0 -18.2 -26.8 -18.0 -8.7 -16.3 -13.9 -2.4 
^Source (see Table 2.2). 
Developed countries. 
Original nine members of the European Economic Community. 
Centrally Planned Nations. 
^Developing Nations. 
^Rapidly Developing Nations (OPEC and NONOPEC regions). 
^Moderately Developing Nations. 
^Minus sign indicates net importers. 
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Corporation (CCC) manages the government coarse grain stock 
policy. Until 1977, the disposal price of CCC stocks served 
as a price ceiling as long as stocks were held, while the 
nonrecourse loan program provided a domestic price floor. The 
1977 Agricultural Act significantly increased the gap between 
the loan rate and the CCC stock-release price. 
The U.S. as the dominant market supplier essentially has 
maintained world prices between the CCC stock-release price 
and the nonrecourse loan rate. Furthermore, with greater price 
instability under the flexible exchange rate system, the task 
of managing the world price has become more difficult. In 
fact, U.S. domestic price policy took the price corridor 
approach starting with the 19 73 farm legislation, the year 
of the shift to a system of floating rates (Schuh, 1979). 
Argentina The Argentine government has intervened 
extensively in its coarse grain market. Prior to the 1976 
military government, the domestic price was kept under the 
world price (or their export price). This difference was made 
up by two types of taxes: a purpose and a retention tax. 
The purpose tax was used to generate revenues to cover the 
operating expenses of the National Grain Board. The reten­
tion tax was used to fill up the remaining differentials be^ 
tween domestic and foreign prices. Mielke (1977) suggests 
that the military government abandoned the cheap pricing 
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policy in an attempt to liberalize trade. However, retention 
of some export taxes and application of selective devaluation 
of the peso—used to control foreign exchange earnings— 
suggest that the internal prices are still somewhat isolated 
from the world market prices, although to a lesser extent than 
before 19 76. 
Canada^ The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is the sole 
exporting agency for Canadian coarse grain. Since 1935, the 
CWB has also been the major domestic marketing agency for 
grains in general. 
The Canadian government supports a minimum producer price 
by establishing initial producer payments. The payments are 
defined on the basis of anticipated market opportunities and 
become guaranteed minimum prices. After all grains are 
marketed and the CWB's expenses are deducted, the proceeds are 
distributed to producers as final payments based upon the 
grades and qualities of grain delivered. If net returns 
are insufficient to cover the initial payments, the deficit is 
made up by the government. A producer can deliver a quantity 
of a particular grain to the CWB according to the amount of 
land allocated to it. In 1973, the role of the CWB as the 
sole marketer of domestic coarse grain was extended to the 
^This review benefits from two studies by Bray (1978) 
and Shiau and Myers (19 82). 
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private grain trade. The CWB "market price" was determined 
outside the market, while the nonboard market price was 
market determined. In August 1976, the CWB began to offer 
coarse grain for sale in Eastern Canada at a price competitive 
with U.S. corn. Although coarse grain can still be purchased 
through the nonboard market, CWB prices, in effect, became 
ceiling prices, reflecting a change in the competitive 
position of U.S. corn in the eastern Canadian market. 
Australia^ The typical method of marketing coarse grain 
in Australia is through statutory marketing boards which have 
sole authority for buying, handling, and selling of a grain 
in a particular region. This is the basic system for most 
of the barley and sorghum in Australia. Oats are still sold 
via the private trade or through voluntary pools. 
Barley growers have the option to either sell their grain 
to their boards or to buyers in other states. The sorghum 
market is controlled by two boards : Central Queensland Grain 
Sorghum Marketing Board (CQGSMB) and New South Wales Grain 
Sorghum Marketing Board (NSWGSMB). Since 1969/70, Australia 
has, on the average, exported 80% of its sorghum production, 
all of which has been controlled by the two marketing boards. 
^The review here benefited from Richards (1980). 
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Spriggs (19 78) reports that domestic barley prices in 
Australia tend to move with export prices. This is partly 
due to the exception that allows growers to legally sell 
their grain to individuals in another state, and partly to 
competition from oats, which are handled totally by private 
entities. He indicates that, although the domestic barley 
price is set in each state by the particular board operating 
there, domestic barley prices have been highly correlated 
with export prices. 
Because of large Australian sorghum exports (relative 
to production), the domestic selling price of sorghum moves 
closely with world prices. The rapid rise in production and 
exports since 1969 has turned sorghum into an export-oriented 
crop, and the domestic price has become determined largely 
outside of Australia. 
South Africa^ Production and exports of corn—the 
primary South African coarse grain--are completely controlled 
by the South African Maize Board. The board sets consumer and 
producer prices and has been obligated to purchase all pro­
duction. Exports have been handled on a tender basis. Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and Taiwan are major markets. The Board 
generally acquires inventories based on traditional consumption 
^See Bredahl and Green (19 8 3) for more details. 
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patterns and exports the remaining supplies. Witucki (1976) 
found that variations in exports came about more as a function 
of the weather than as a response to economic conditions. 
Therefore, variation in export levels primarily reflects 
variations in supply. 
Thailand Konjing (1977) reported that a large portion 
of Thai coarse grain exports (about 70%) has been covered by 
long-term agreements with importing countries. Recent agree­
ments have not established the price. Export prices have 
been based on the Chicago cash or futures price of U.S. no. 2 
yellow corn. Konjing suggests that export supplies have 
been affected by production, which, in turn, were affected 
by the world price transmission mechanism. 
European Economic Community The Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) of the EEC effectively isolates the domestic 
grain prices of the region from the world market. As many 
authors have indicated, this makes the import demand per­
fectly inelastic with respect to world price (e.g., Raste-
gari (1982), Zwart and Meilke (1979) and Abbott (1979a). 
The objective of the CAP is to protect the EEC domestic 
markets from nonmember country exports and to reduce food 
dependency. The main features of CAP have been the removal of 
all restrictions on member countries' trade of commodities, 
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uniform support prices for agricultural products among 
members, and the imposition of a common system of tariffs 
with respect to third countries. The import grain prices 
are bound to a minimum level called "threshold price". Its 
purpose is to assure that grain imported from nonmember 
countries sells at or above the EEC "target price". The 
"target price" is fixed at the level which is hoped producers 
achieve on the open market in the community where grain is 
in short supply. 
Japan Barley imports are handled by the Japanese 
government. The practice has been to purchase barley at world 
prices and resell it at much higher prices. Japan's coarse 
grain imports, however, are corn dominated, which is free 
of governmental policy intervention. Japan's extreme de­
pendence on the international coarse grain market (100 per­
cent of consumption), indicates Japan's importance in the 
world coarse grain market. Clearly, Japan's domestic and 
trading policies have allowed the world price to affect its 
internal markets. 
Other Western Europe^ Most countries in Western 
Europe outside the EEC (OWE) utilize state trading corpora­
tions to purchase coarse grain. In addition, many of the 
^See Bredahl and Green (19 83) for more detail. 
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OWE countries pursue low and subsidized domestic food programs. 
In view of these policies, the import demand elasticity is 
likely very low. 
USSR Schmitz et al. (1981) indicate that the USSR 
appears to have decided to maintain domestic coarse grain 
consumption levels despite extreme variations in domestic 
production. They indicate that because of rising real incomes 
combined with stable prices, consumers have increased the de­
mand for meat. Having decided on its import needs, the 
country state-trades and tends to bargain on prices. 
Because of these reasons, the price elasticity of USSR 
import demand is likely very small. On the other hand, a CIA 
(19 79) report predicts that the USSR will have foreign ex­
change problems in the 1980s. With the USSR's growing import 
quantities and exchange shortages, one may expect to see more 
price response. 
Schmitz et al. (1981) report that the bulk of the USSR 
foreign exchange is made up of gold; in addition, the USSR 
is a large gold exporter. Therefore, so long as gold prices 
increase more rapidly than grain prices, the cost of im­
porting grains to the USSR will decrease. 
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Eastern Europe Except for Yugoslavia, all other mem­
bers of this region have historically shown very small adjust­
ments to world price movements. Their imports reflect the 
national priority of increased meat production and inadequate 
domestic coarse grain supplies to meet that goal. Their in­
creased consumption is due to the fact that their real incomes 
have doubled since 1966, while their domestic nominal prices 
have remained constant by political necessity (Schmitz et al., 
1981) . 
Less developing regions In general, the LDC countries 
are characterized by rapidly growing populations, rising 
incomes, and less rapidly growing and unstable agricultural 
production. Domestic policies that maintain low urban food 
prices and the lack of resources to increase producer prices 
have increased their dependence on external food sources. 
Foreign exchange availability, therefore, appears to be the 
major limiting factors on grain purchases. 
The OPEC region, however, does not suffer from foreign 
exchange limitations. In fact, one can anticipate that the 
food demand could soon become saturated. However, rising 
per capita incomes are increasing the demand for meat. To 
the extent that meat production can be expanded, demand 
for coarse grain should increase. Because of relatively 
high income levels, these countries import meat rather than 
feedstuffs. 
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The remaining LDCs are commonly characterized by poverty 
and extreme foreign exchange limitations. Coarse grain is a 
commodity used by affluent nations that can afford the high 
cost of producing meat. Among all the limiting factors in 
meat production, the low urban food price policy generally 
practiced by these nations is known as the most important. 
Because of cheap food policies—perhaps due to political 
necessity--there has not been a connection between the 
domestic and world prices in these countries. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the world grain trade model 
used in this study in both conceptual and mathematical 
terras. The graphic representation indicates the model type, 
its advantages, and limitations. The mathematical concep­
tual model describes the theoretical foundation, variable 
specifications, and expected signs of the variables in each 
equation. 
Conceptual Analysis 
The coarse grain trade model used is a multi-country 
nonspatial equilibrium type (Thompson, 1981). To incorporate 
the world market influence on U.S. agricultural markets, 
many studies attach an aggregate export demand from the 
rest of the world as an additional sector. These models are 
known as two-region models. One region is composed of the 
behavioral equations depicting the domestic market of the 
country of interest, and the other explains the country's 
net trade in the particular commodity of interest. Two-
region models assume that the behavioral responses to changing 
world market conditions are identical. However, different 
countries permit different rates of adjustments in their 
domestic markets in response to changes in world market 
conditions. The two-region model, therefore, can only be 
70 
used to analyze the domestic and foreign trade policies of a 
particular country. A measurement of the effect of ex­
ogenous world market shocks on that country's world export 
or import share is not possible. 
A multi-regional nonspatial model, however, consists of 
internal and external sectors of all importing and exporting 
regions. All trading regions are then linked together through 
the world balance of total supply and demand, determined 
simultaneously with the world price. • A multi-regional non-
spatial model can be used to conduct various policy impact 
analyses to measure the resulting effects on world trade 
and on the markets of all trading countries. The model allows 
for domestic price differences due to policy factors and 
transportation costs. 
Nonspatial models assume homogeneity of the trading 
product in terms of physical characteristics and country 
of origin, and consider only net trade flow of each region. 
In this respect, nonspatial models are limited in their 
capacity to consider regional trade flows and market shares 
analysis. Nevertheless, nonspatial models provide the 
necessary components to address the question of interest 
in this research. 
The coarse grain trade model to be used in this model 
will be composed of three country categories; exporting 
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countries, importing countries, and a world market clearing 
sector. The domestic and trade sectors of all trading 
regions are linked through the world trade clearance equation 
and price linkage equations of coarse grain. The general 
structure of the model is illustrated graphically in 
Figure 3.1 (Williams, 1981, p. 271). 
The domestic markets of any exporting country i is 
represented by relationships (l)-(3). Similarly, the 
domestic market of any importing country is explained by re­
lationships (5)-(7). These relationships represent the coarse 
grain production, demand, and stock response of any exporting 
or importing country to changes in variables such as prices. 
Equations (4) and (8) are, respectively, an exporting country's 
excess supply and an importing country's excess demand identi­
ties . These are international trade equations for exporting 
and importing countries which link the internal and external 
sectors of each region. 
Equation (9) represents the coarse grain price linkages 
between the exporting and importing regions in the model. 
Kl and K2 represent policy factors and transportation costs, 
adjusted to local currency for coarse grain that cause these 
regional prices to diverge. 
Equation (11) is the international trade flow linkage. 
World trade and all domestic sectors of all regions are linked 
through these trade identities. Through these identities. 
Domestic Market of 
Exporter i^ International Price Linkage 
Domestic Market of 
Importer 
(5) Coarse grain production (QPjl 
(6) Coarse grain consumption (D.) 
(7) Coarse grain stock (I4) ^ 
(9) Importer j coarse grain 
price = (Kl) • Exporter i 
coarse grain price + (K2) 
(1) Coarse grain production (QP.) 
(2) Coarse grain consumption (D.) 
(3) Coarse grain inventory (I.) 
/N Î /N 
Exchange Rate 
(10) Exchange rates (e%j) 
six 
Excess Supply (ES) of 
Exporter i 
International Trade Flow 
Linkage 
Excess Demand (ED) by 
Importer j 
(4) ES of coarse grain = 
QP.-D.-Al.^ 
(8) ED of coarse grain = 
D.-QP.+AI. (11) ZES.•= ZED. 
^i = any exporter, i=l,...,n; and j = any importer, j=l,...,m. 
^The Kl and K2 include exchange rate, and valorem taxes (subsidies), specific tax (subsidy), 
and transportation costs. 
'^Should be read "change in". 
Figure 3.1. Schematic representation of the conceptual model of the world coarse grain market 
(adapted from Williams, 1981) 
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and the price linkage equations, regional trade volumes, 
domestic supplies, domestic disappearances, and coarse grain 
prices are determined for each region. 
Finally, Equation (10) is added to endogenize exchange 
rates as a function of money supplies, real incomes, and 
interest rates. In the structural model used in this study. 
Equation (10) accounts for the impact of U.S. monetary 
policy on the value of the U.S. dollar world prices, the 
quantity traded, production, and domestic disappearance. 
To reduce the size of the model, all regional com­
ponents of the model, except the U.S., are expressed in 
reduced form. For example, for a given importer j. Equations 
(5-7) are substituted into (8) to express the country's net 
imports as a function of domestic price and all other vari­
ables on the right hand sides of Equations (5-7). The 
essential feature of the net export or import demand functions 
is that they reflect the behavior of the respective exporting 
or importing countries in the world market as perceived by 
the other trading countries. Owing to quantitative restric­
tions on trade or the nature of the trade decision-making 
process, prices may not have an effect on the quantity traded. 
That is, for selected countries, export supply or import 
demand might be exogenously determined, without regard for 
world market price. 
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Mathematical Representation 
A general concept behind each equation in this trade 
model is described in Table 3.1 with the variable definitions 
in Table 3.2. The expected signs are indicated above each 
variable in parentheses. 
The United States coarse grain production (1) is de­
termined by yield times acreage harvested. Yields are 
assumed to be exogenous, while acreage harvested (2) is a 
function of acreage planted. An appropriate acreage 
response function (3) has received attention in the litera­
ture since government programs usually require planting 
within guidelines. Consequently, realistic analyses of 
acreage response must account for government influence as 
well as the market. Programs such as guaranteed minimum 
prices on production, payment for diverting land out of pro­
duction, and set aside as prerequisites for access to loans 
are the common forms of acreage control. 
Houck et al. (1976) analyzed the impact of various 
government programs on crop acreage response functions. In 
this study, the "effective support and diversion payment 
rate" method and market prices are used to include both 
government and market attractiveness. Effective rates are 
the product of announced nominal payment rates on planted 
acreage and the proportion of base acreage eligible for 
Table 3.1. General model of world coarse grain market 
(1) QPl^ 5 YLDl AHl 
(2) AH1_ = 
(+) 
f(APl^) 
( + ) 
CWPl 
(3) APl^ = 
(4) FDl^ = 
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(9) WPCRN8^ = K81^-E8US^.CWP1^ + K82^ 
Table 3.1 (Continued) 
(-) (-) (-) (+) 
(10) NMTIO^ = f(PRICElO^, QPIO^, BIIO^, GCAUIO^) 
(11) PRICEIO = CWP1^/PRG0LD78^ 
(+) (-) (-) 
NPRCRN2 WPS0M2 (+) (+) PL2 (-) 
U2I • 5S5Î57- BIZ^, GCA02^) 
(13) NPRCRN2 = K21 • E2JA • WPCRNB + K22 
t t t t t 
(+) (-) (-) 
BARWP3 WPS0M3 (+) (+) PL3 (-) 
(14) NXT3^  . 5iF5—• 8"t- DÊF3-' 
t t t 
(15) BARWP3^ = K31^ • E3JA^ • WPCRNS^ + K32^ 
(+) (-) (-) 
CGP4 WPS0M4 (+) (+) PL4 (-) 
(16) NXT4^  - f I5S4^ . BiFiT"- GP4t' ®"f 
(17) CGP4^ = K41^ • E4JA^• WPCRNB + K4t2 
Table 3.1 (Continued) 
{ + )  ( - )  ( - )  
WPCRN5 WPS0M5 (+) (+) PL5 (-) 
(18) NXT5^ = 515^ ' 
(19) WPCRNS^ = K51^ • E5JA^ . WPCRNS^ -r K52_ t t t t t 
(+) (-) {-) 
EXPRCRN6 WPS0M5 (+) (+) PL6 (-) 
(20) NXK^  . eP6^ , B16^ , —, GCSU5^ ) 
(21) EXPRCRN6 = K61^ ' ELJA • WPCRN8 + K62^ 
(22) SEEDCl^ = (BIl^+QPl^) - (NFDl^+NXTl^+EIl^+FDl^) 
(23) NXTl = (NMT8 + NMTIO + NMTREST ) - (NXT2 + NXT3 + NXT4 + NXT5 + NXT6 ) t t t  t  t t t t t  
Table 3.2. Definitions of variables in general model of world coarse grain market 
Endogenous variables 
QPl^ = U.S. coarse grain production in period t 
AHl^ = U.S. coarse grain acreage harvested in period t 
APl^ = U.S. Coarse grain acreage planted in period t 
CWPl^ = U.S. coarse grain price ($/MT) in period t 
FDl^ = U.S. coarse grain feed demand in period t 
NFDl^ = U.S. coarse grain food demand in period t 
EIl^ = U.S. coarse grain ending inventory demand in period t 
E8US^ = Japan-U.S. exchange rate, yen/U.S. $ in period t 
NMT8^ = Japan net coarse grain import demand in period t 
WPCRNS^ = Japan coarse grain price (yen/MT) in period t 
NMTIO^ = USSR net coarse grain import demand in period t 
PRICEIO^ = U.S. goarse grain price in terms of gold (02/MT) in period t 
NXT2^ = Argentina net coarse grain exports supply in period t 
NPRCRN2^ = Argentina coarse grain price (pesos/MT in period t 
NXT3^ = Canada net coarse grain exports supply in period t 
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
BARWP3^ = Canada coarse grain price in period t 
NXT4^ = Australia net coarse grain exports supply in period t 
CGP4^ - Australia coarse grain price (Aus $/MT) in period t 
NXT5^ = South Africa net coarse grain export supply in period t 
WPCRNS^ = South africa coarse grain price (Rand/MT) in period t 
NXT6^ = Thailand net coarse grain export supply in period t 
EXPRCRN6^= Thailand coarse grain price (Baht/MT) in period t 
NXTl^ = U.S. net coarse grain export supply in period t 
Exogenous variables 
YLDl^ = U.S. coarse grain yield per hectare in period t 
AP1^_^ = U.S. coarse grain acreage planted in period t-1 
CWP1^_^ = U.S. coarse grain price in period t-1 
ESRF^ = U.S. coarse grain effective support rate in period t 
EDRF^ = U.S. coarse grain effective diversion raté in period t 
PC^_^ = U.S. coarse grain effective competitor crop price in period t-1 
ESRC^ = U.S. coarse grain effective competitor crop support rate in period t 
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
EDRC^ = U.S. coarse grain effective competitor crop diversion rate in period t 
IPPFl^ = Index of prices of all commodities used in U.S. agricultural production in period t 
IPPFl^ ^ = IPPFl in period t-1 
PLl^ = U.S. livestock and product price in period t 
PL1^_^ = PLl in period t-1 
WPSOMl^ = U.S. soymeal price in period t 
WPS0M1^_^ = U.S. soymeal price in period t-1 
GCAUl^ = Number of U.S. grain consuming animal units in period t 
CPIl^ = U.S. consumer price index in period t 
CPI1^_^ = U.S. consumer price index in period t-1 
PS^ = U.S. price index of related goods to coarse grain food demand in period t 
GNPl^ = U.S. gross national product in period t 
WPIXl^ = U.S. wholesale price index in period t 
BIl^ = U.S. beginning coarse grain inventory in period t 
MSl^ = U.S. money supply in period t 
RDYl^ = U.S. real income in period t 
DRl^ = U.S. interest rate in period t 
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
MS8^ = Japan money supply in period t 
RDY8^ = Japan real income in period t 
DR8^ = Japan interest rate in period t 
WPSOMB^ = Japan price of other major competing noncoarse grain feed in period t 
QP8^ = Japan coarse grain rpoduction in period t 
BI8^ = Japan beginning coarse grain inventory in period t 
PL8^ = Japan livestock and product price in period t 
GCAU8^ = Japan number of grain consuming animal units in period t 
WPI8^ = Japan wholesale general price index in period t 
K81^, K82t = all factors which differentiate the Japanese and U.S. coarse grain prices in period 
QPIO^ = USSR coarse grain production in period t 
BIIO^ = USSR beginning coarse grain inventory in period t 
PRGOLD78^ = Price of gold (US $/oz) in period t 
WPS0M2^ = Argentina price of other major competing noncoarse grain feed in period t 
QP2^ = Argentina coarse grain product in period t 
BI2^ = Argentina beginning coarse grain inventory in period t 
PL2^ = Argentina livestock and product price in period t 
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
GCAU2^ = Argentina number of grain consuming animal units in period t 
WGPI2^ = Argentina general price index in period t 
E2JA^ = Argentina-Japan exchange rate (pesos/yen) in period t 
K21^, K22^ = All factors which differentiate the Argentinian and U.S. coarse grain prices in 
period t 
WPS0M3^ = Canada price of other major competing noncoarse grain feed in period t 
QP3^ = Canada coarse grain production in period t 
BI3^ = Canada beginning coarse grain inventory in period t 
PL3^ = Canada livestock and product price in period t 
GCAU3^ = Canada number of grain consuming animal units in period t 
DEF3^ = Canadian implicit price deflator in period t 
E3JA^ = Canada-Japan exchange rate (Can $/year) in period t 
K31^, K32^ = All factors which differentiate the Canadian and U.S. coarse grain prices in period t 
WPS0M4^ = Australia price of other major competing noncoarse grain feed in period t 
QP4^ = Australia coarse grain production in period t 
BI4^ = Australia beginning coarse grain inventory in period t 
PL4^ = Australia livestock and product price in period t 
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
GCAU4^ = Australia number of grain consuming animal units in period t 
DEF4^ = Australian implicit price deflator in period t 
E4JA^ = Australia-Japan exchange rate (Aus $/yen) in period t 
K41^, K42^ = All factors which differentiate the Australian and U.S. coarse grain prices 
in period t 
WPSOMS^ = South Africa price of other major competing noncoarse grain feed in period t 
QP5^ = South Africa coarse grain production in period t 
BI5^ = South Africa beginning coarse grain inventory in period t 
PL5^ = South Africa livestock and product price in period t 
GCAU5^ = South Africa number of grain consuming animal units in period t 
CPI5^ = South Africa wholesale general price index in period t 
WPS0M5^ = Thailand price of other major competing noncoarse grain feed in period t 
QP6^ = Thailand coarse grain production in period t 
BI6^ = Thailand beginning coarse grain inventory in period t 
PL6^ = Thailand livestock and product price in period t 
GCAU6^ = Thailand number of grain consuming animal units in period t 
CPI5^ = Thailand consumer price index in period t 
Table 3.2 (Continued) 
E5JA^ = Thailand-Japan exchange rate (Baht/yen) in period t 
K61^, K62^ = All factors which differentiate the Thai and U.S. coarse grain prices in period t 
SEEDCl^ = U.S. coarse grain seed consumption in period t 
NMTREST^ = Rest of the world net coarse grain imports in period t 
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planting (or required for diversion and set aside). In effect, 
these variables state the payment rate in terms of the base 
acreage. Announced payment rates are typically expressed in 
terms of planted or diverted acreage. Equation (3) in Table 
3.1 is based on the result of the Nerlovian distributed lag 
concept, in which naive price expectation is assumed (Labys, 
1973). 
The United States coarse grain demands are composed of 
three parts: feed demand (4), nonfeed demand (5), and ending 
inventory demand (6). 
The feed demand (4) is derived from the demand for 
livestock and livestock products. The feed demand equation is 
derived through considering a producer maximizing current and 
anticipated net revenue in a two period framework. Because 
of the competitive nature of the market, current prices of 
livestock and livestock products are given to the producer. 
However, the anticipated price is formed independently of the 
producer's production decisions. Furthermore, a production 
function is assumed to represent the technical relationship 
between production and inputs. 
Decisions to be made in period one are the number of 
animals to be fed and marketed this period and the next 
period. Up to some point, the producer can increase the 
number of stocked and marketed animals. However, after that 
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point, the increase in the number of either will come at the 
expense of the other. The production function jointly deter­
mines the number of grain consuming animal units fed and 
marketing of livestock and livestock products in each 
period. 
In the current period, the number of grain consuming 
animal units fed and the marketing of livestock and live­
stock products are assumed to depend on the amount of coarse 
grain and other feeds fed in the period and the number of 
grain consuming animal units fed in the previous period. 
Also, a similar production function is assumed to be obtained 
in the next period. In other words, the expansion in the 
current period is constrained by the number of grain con­
suming animal units fed in the previous period. This assump­
tion is justified, since the marketing of animals from gesta­
tion takes from one-half year to several years for larger 
animals such as hogs and beef cattle. In fact, the indices 
for grain consuming animal units currently fed and marketed 
have larger weights for older and larger animals, which were 
fed last year. Also, other animals, such as dairy cows and 
breeding stock, can last many years. 
The producer is assumed to maximize the current and 
anticipated revenue, i.e.. 
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R= [(PL)-L- (PF)-F - (PO)-O] + [(PL^^)-L^^- (PF)^^. 
>^+1 - IPO'+l-O+l' 
subject to both production functions constraints. If the 
implicit joint production functions can be separated into addi­
tive functions of inputs and outputs, then the Langrangian 
function can be written as: 
H = R + a[g(AU,L) - f (F, 0, AU_j^) ] + b [h (AU^^ 
- k(F+i'0+l'AU)] 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
PL = price of livestock and livestock products; 
PF = price of coarse grain; 
PO = price of other feeds; 
AU = number of grain-consuming animal units fed; 
L = marketing of livestock and livestock products; 
F = quantity of other feeds fed; 
a,b = Langrangian multipliers; 
0 = quantity of other feeds fed; 
a,b = Lagrangian multipliers; 
g,f,h,k = undefined functional forms. 
The subscript +1 indicates anticipated or planned values, 
while -1 indicates the value of a variable during the previous 
period. 
If the function is well-behaved, so that a constrained 
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maximum is defined by first order conditions, the following 
deductions can be made: 
PF^ = PL and, 
dL 
dL -, dF 1 do . 
P^dÂÛ = PL+i aÂD- = -PF+i dÂÛ- = -PO+1 dÂû- • 
The first of these two expressions says that, in equilibrium, 
the return from a unit increase in marketing livestock and 
livestock products equals the cost of coarse grain needed to 
produce the additional unit. The second of the two expressions 
states that the marginal coarse grain cost of increase in fed 
animal units in this period equals the anticipated marginal 
revenue of selling the additional animal. This is also equal 
to the marginal savings of the cost of either coarse grain or 
other feed that would be possible if the current marginal in­
crease in animal units fed were substituted for coarse grain 
or other feed fed in the next period, leaving the next 
period's output unchanged. 
If the ten first order conditions in ten unknowns are 
solvable, the coarse grain demand for animal feed can be 
expressed as: 
(  +  )  (  +  )  ( - )  ( - )  (  +  )  (  +  )  (  +  )  
P = F(PL, PL^^, PF, PF+^, PO, PO^^, AU_^). 
Under the naive price expectation assumption, and using 
slightly different notations, the last equation above becomes 
Equation (4) in the general model in Table 3.1. 
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The United States nonfeed coarse grain demand by industry 
is Equation 5 in Table 3.1 and is also a derived demand. 
This equation can be thought of as a reduced form equation. 
The nonfeed coarse grain consumption is used to produce food 
such as baked goods, processed foods, and alcoholic beverages. 
Assuming perfect competition in output and input markets of 
this industry, the nonfeed demand is specified to depend 
negatively on the real price of coarse grain and positively 
on the real price of related products and real national 
income, representing consumer demand capacity. 
The traditional inventory demand theory assumes that 
inventories are part of the total demand. The speculators 
will stock so long as the marginal cost and return (measured 
by the difference in the expected and observed prices) of 
stockholding are equal. Others have argued that agricultural 
inventories can increase as general economic activities ex­
pand for two reasons; (1) the necessary time lags in moving 
grain through marketing channels, and (2) processors' pre­
cautionary motives to stockpile to meet production goals 
(Labys, 1973). 
Heien (1977) suggested that inventories, to the extent 
that they are a measure of market disequilibrium, determine 
the rate of price adjustment. However, the application of 
the disequilibrium approach by Gallagher et al. (1981) did 
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not produce satisfactory results. The model used by Gallagher 
et al. used annual data. The equilibrium, however, occurs 
within one crop year. The disequilibrium approach, however, 
can be applied to quarterly data. 
The inventory demand specification (Equation 6) in 
Table 3.1 utilized in this study assumes two motives for 
stockpiling: (1)transactional and (2) speculative. There­
fore, the desired ending transaction demand is assumed to 
be a function of current production. Desired speculative 
demand is a function of real price in the current period. 
If linear functions are assumed, then the sum of the two 
desired ending stocks (EI*) can be presented as: 
(-) ^ 
(+) CMP 
BIZ = cPi;^ 
where the variables are as defined in Table 3.2 for any 
region in the model. 
Assume that stockholders adjust their inventories only 
partially toward their desired or equilibrium level in each 
period. This partial adjustment may result from a budget 
constraint associated with the speed of adjustment. To 
adjust quickly to the desired level requires higher 
adjustment costs. Therefore, assume that the beginning • 
stock is partially adjusted only some fraction k of the 
distance required to reach the desired or equilibrium ending 
stock : 
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(EI^-BI^) =k(EI*-BI^); 0<k<1. 
Solving for 
EI^ = k-EI* + (l-k).BI^. 
Plugging the first of the above three equations into the 
last yields Equation (6) for the U.S. ending inventory of 
coarse grain in Table 3.1. 
As explained earlier, the trading behavior of the re­
maining major regions are expressed by their reduced form 
net trade relationships. Equations (8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 
20) in Table 3.1, are the net trade equations for Japan, 
the USSR, Argentina, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and 
Thailand, respectively. Net trade of the EEC, China, Eastern 
Europe, and LDCs are aggregated into one variable and treated 
as the exogenous part of the world coarse grain market in 
the international trade flow linkage Equation (23) in Table 
3.1. This is justified for reasons given in Chapter II. 
For example, European Economic Community's Common Agricultural 
Policy prevents any transmission of the world price fluctua­
tions on their domestic market. In Eastern Europe, the 
official domestic prices are set by fiat without regard for 
world market price. In China, the volume of trade is ex-
ogenously determined by a state agency. In all cases, from 
the perspective of the rest of the world, the domestic 
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market structure is not affected by world market conditions. 
For those endogenous countries, excluding the United 
States, that permit world market price adjustments to be re­
flected directly in their domestic markets, the following 
general model of a small country market i is used to 
derive their net trade behavioral equations under the 
assumption that markets are perfectly competitive: 
(-) ( + ) (+) (+) 
(23.1) Q° = f(F\, p9, PL^, AU^, X^) 
(+) (+) 
(23.2) qJ = f(Q?, I^) 
(23.3) = qI - Qi 
where 
q9 = total coarse grain demand in period t; 
= coarse grain price in period t; 
Q  
P^ = coarse grain competitor crop price in period t; 
PL^ = livestock and product price in period t; 
p 
= coarse grain production in period t; 
AUj^ = number of grain consuming animal units in period t; 
S 
= total coarse grain supply in period t; 
I= beginning coarse grain inventory in period t; 
= excess demand (or supply) in period t; 
= any other demand shifter, such as changes in taste 
or consumption patterns. 
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The coarse grain demand Equation (23.1) is the total 
coarse grain demand, i.e., feed, nonfeed, and ending in­
ventory demands. Its derivation is based on the economic 
theory used for the United States demand. The supply 
Equation (42), however, follows Nerlove's argument that in 
P the current period production (Q^) is predetermined through 
variables observed in the previous period (Labys, 1973). 
Furthermore, supply is not equal to production. Rather, 
it is a fraction of the production and the beginning inven­
tory. Abbott (19 76) indicates that in small countries, the 
fraction of production and beginning inventory which is 
actually supplied to the markets, depends upon the urban/ 
rural terms of trade. 
By plugging Equations (23.1) and (23.2) into (23.3), one 
can express the net trade as a function of domestic price 
and all other variables in the system. The net trade 
equation for the regions listed above in Table 3.1 are de­
rived in this way. 
Equations (9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19) in Table 3.1 are the 
required price linkage equations. The price differences 
among regions are accounted for by different tariffs, domestic 
taxes, subsidies, and transportation costs. 
The relationship of the domestic price of any region i 
and the world price in the domestic currency is derived as 
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follows : 
(45) + B^(E.P") 
where 
= domestic price of country i in period t; 
Pw = a world price; 
E = exchange rate of country i; 
= level of domestic shock barrier of the world price 
transmission' 
= level of the degree of the world price fluctuation 
transmitted to the domestic price. 
If any fluctuation in the world price is fully trans­
mitted to domestic price, i.e., transmission is one-to-
one, then we expect A^ ^  0 and = 1. 
Thus, any difference between the domestic and world 
price levels measured in domestic currency is due to trans­
portation cost and other additive factors. 
Given a set of price linkage equations, the "world" 
price could be any one of the regional prices. In this 
model, Japan's price is used to link all regions. 
For reasons explained in Chapter II, the price variable 
used for the USSR is the U.S. coarse grain price in ounces of 
gold. Therefore, Equation (11) is used as the price linkage 
for the USSR (see Appendix B). 
The primary objective of this study is to assess the 
impact of U.S. monetary policy on the world coarse grain 
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market through its effect on the U.S. exchange rate. There­
fore, the exchange rate must be endogenous in the model. 
As will be illustrated below, the monetary approach to ex­
change rate determination provides the theoretical basis to 
explain exchange rate movements by the money supply and 
other variables (Equation 7, Table 3.1). 
The U.S. exchange rate variable in this model (E8US) 
is defined as the value of a dollar in terms of Japanese 
yen. Japan is chosen because it is one of the leading trade 
partners of the United States. In addition, Japan is the 
largest coarse grain importing country after the EEC. 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the deter­
mination of exchange rate under the monetary approach and the 
derivation of the exchange rate (Equation 8). 
Monetary approach to exchange rate determination 
If the balance of payments is divided into more than 
two accounts, for example, the current, capital, and money 
accounts, then each account can be explained with a direct 
or an indirect approach. Using the demands and supplies 
th for the k item as a classification procedure for explaining 
the k^^ account constitutes the direct approach. An account 
can be explained indirectly by first explaining the other 
n-1 accounts and then adding the results. Monetary econo­
mists argue that the tradition has been to explain current 
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and capital accounts directly. Therefore, the money account 
(or the settlement account) should receive symmetric treat­
ment. 
By Walras' Law, the net excess supply of goods and 
securities by residents of a country represent a net 
excess demand for money. Thus, the traditional approach to 
the balance of payments that specified behavioral rela­
tionships for the trade and capital accounts contained an 
implicit monetary condition. However, the condition was not 
necessarily one that would have seemed reasonable if money 
supply and demand functions had been developed explicitly. 
Johnson (1977) specifies the money market of a country 
under flexible exchange rates, in this case Japan, as: 




= Japan nominal money demand; 
= Japan general price level; 
y^ = Japan real income; 
r^ = Japan interest rate; 
Mg = Japan exogenous money supply. 
The assumptions are; (1) the demand for money is a 
stable function of a few independent variables, and (2) demand 
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is homogeneous of degree one in price. 
Adding the purchasing power parity equation allows one 
to examine the effects of changes in the money supply and/or 
demand on Japan's exchange rate. For Japan, this equation 
is: 
pi = e.pus 
where 
= Japan general price level; 
e = Japan exchange rate, yen/US $; 
P^^= U.S. general price level. 
Combining these equations yields the following equation; 
= pi.L^(yi,ri) • 
Rewriting this equation in terms of rate of growth yields: 
. G^ + E^ • G^ 
s p y y r r 
where 
Gg = Japan rate of growth of money supply; 
Gp = Japan rate of growth of general price level; 
Ey = Japan real income elasticity of money demand; 
Gy = Japan rate of growth of real income; 
' i -
'r = 
Writing the purchasing power parity equation in terms of 
E^ = Japan interest rate elasticity of money demand; 
G^ Japan rate of growth of interest rate. 
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growth rates and substituting the result for in the above 
equation yields: 
G^ = G^® + G + E^. • G^ + . G^ 
s p e y y r r 
where 
Gp = U.S. rate of growth of general price level; 
Gg = rate of growth of exchange rate. 
Solving for G^ yields: 
4 -
The above equation states that an increase in the rate 
of growth of Japan's money supply will depreciate the value 
of the Japanese yen, ceteris paribus. Similarly, given all 
other variables, an increase in the rate of growth of Japan's 
real income will appreciate the value of the Japanese currency; 
and an increase in the rate of growth of Japanese interest 
rate causes the Japanese currency to depreciate in value. 
The intuition behind the above deductions is based on 
the money market. The term in parentheses above represents 
changes in the Japanese demand for money. The Japanese 
currency will depreciate if the demand for money declines 
relative to the supply. Because the interest rate elasticity 
of money demand is negative, for example, an increase in the 
interest rate will reduce the quantity of money demanded and 
cause the currency to depreciate in value. 
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A similar equation can be derived for the United States. 
Obviously, any variable affecting U.S. money supply or demand 
will have an opposite effect on e as compared to the same 
Japanese variable affecting Japanese money supply or demand, 
ceteris paribus. 
Derivation of the exchange rate equation 
To link e to the monetary sectors of the United States 
and Japan, the money market equilibrium conditions of both 
countries and the purchasing power parity equation are needed: 
MUS ^ pUS ^ LUS(yUS^^US) 
Mp = p] . (y],r]) 
pi = e . P^® 
where 
for k = j (Japan), us (the United States); 
k Mg = country k money supply; 
k Pg = country k general price level; 
L = country k real money demand; 
y = country k real income; 
r^ = country k interest rate; 
e = value of U.S. dollar in Japanese yen. 
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By solving for and in the first two equations 
above and plugging into the third equation, the exchange 
rate can be defined by the following: 
^us 
s 
Taking the logarithmic time differential (denoted by 
of the above equation yields: 
ê = (mJ - MgS) + (£,^® - L^). 
The first term in parentheses in this equation repre­
sents the effects of nominal monetary changes on the ex­
change rate. Given other variables, this implies that an 
increase in Japanese money supply will increase e (a de­
preciation of the yen). Similarly, as was argued in the 
preceding section, an increase in the U.S. money supply will 
decrease e (a depreciation of the dollar), ceteris paribus. 
The second term in parentheses in the above equation captures 
the effects of changes in real money demand. Other variables 
constant, an increase in the U.S. real demand for money will 
increase e (an appreciation of the dollar). Similarly, an 
increase in the Japan real demand for money will decrease e 
(an appreciation of the yen), ceteris paribus. 
Given that the real demand for money, under the monetary 
approach, is a stable function of a few variables, the last 
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equation can be written, in functional form, to have the fol­
lowing directional relationships: 
(+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) 
e = f(Mj, yJ, r3, r"=). 
The partial derivative signs can be explained in­
tuitively by the money markets. An increase in the money 
stock of any currency brings about an excess supply of money, 
which puts a downward pressure on the value of that currency 
> 0, < 0) . Given that income elasticity of money 
9mJ 9m"® 
i ® us 
demand (E^ or E^ ) is positive, an increase in the income 
of any country brings about an excess demand for money, 
which puts an upward pressure on the value of the country's 
currency < 0, > 0) . Finally, under the assumption 
9y] 9y"® 
that interest rate elasticity of money demand (Ep, e"®) is 
negative, an increase in interest rate of any country de­
presses demand for money and brings about an excess supply 
of money, which puts a downward pressure on the value of 
the country's currency (—-r > 0, —— < 0) . 
9r^ 9r"® 
The mathematical model developed in this chapter and 
given in Table 3.1, can be divided into two components: the 
world coarse grain market and the exchange rate determina­
tion system. The exchange rate component was developed 
above and consists of one equation explaining movements in 
the value of the U.S. dollar. In this equation, the exchange 
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rate is a function of only exogenous variables and could, 
therefore, be estimated separately from the other equations 
in the model. However, the 1960-80 period of study consists 
of both fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Conse­
quently, the explanatory variables of the exchange rate 
equation as developed above had no effect on the dependent 
variable for the period over which the exchange rate was 
fixed. In recognition of this fact, a grafted polynomial 
technique (Fuller, 1976) will be used to estimate the 
parameters of the exchange rate equation (see Chapter IV for 
more detail). 
Although the flexible regime was adopted officially 
in 1973, a transition from a fixed to flexible exchange rate 
system occurred between 19 71 and 1973 during which currency 
devaluations became the common alternative to government 
interventions to keep exchange rates fixed. 
The mathematical model presented in Table 3.1 is capable 
of assessing the impacts of monetary policy on the world 
coarse grain market through endogenizing the exchange rate. 
The model consists of nine regions, of which eight are 
endogenous. The last region is the exogenous rest-of-the-
world coarse grain trade. The model is composed of 23 
equations (equal to the number of endogenous variables), some 
of which are nonlinear. 
The following chapter discusses the nonlinearity of the 
102b 
model and estimation procedure, and reports the results 
the estimation. 
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter is divided into two main sections; esti­
mation and validation. The former section reports the 
properties of the model, estimation procedure, and the 
results. The second section is devoted to the validation 
of the model. 
Estimation 
The mathematical structure of the world coarse grain 
market component of the model as described in Chapter III is 
nonlinear. In general, fundamental identities as well as many 
other basic variables (e.g., relative prices) form ratios that 
render the model nonlinear. The estimation technique used for 
this component is the two stage least square procedure 
(Amemiya, 19 74). Consider a nonlinear equation to be: 
Yt = f(Zt' ^t 
where y^ is a scalar dependent variable, is a scalar 
2 
random variable with zero mean and constant variance a , 
is composed of g endogenous variables (that is, inde­
pendent variables correlated with y^) and k exogenous vari­
ables (that is, known constants), B is the vector of un­
known parameters, and f is a nonlinear function. The 
function is assumed to have continuous first and second 
104a 
derivations with respect to B. 
Amemiya shows that under certain large sample assump­
tions, the two stage least squares estimation of B (denoted 
B) will be asymptotically unbiased with normal distribution. 
The assumptions are: 
(1) is identically and independently distributed; 
(2) lim(l/n)X'X exists and is nonsinqular where X is the 
m X k matrix of exogenous variables with rank k; 
(3) (1/n)(8f/9B)X converges in probability to a 
constant matrix of rank g uniformly in B; 
(4) (1/n)(8^f'/3B.9B)X converges in probability to a 
constant matrix uniformly in B for all i = l,...,g, 
where B^ is the ith element of B. 
The principal component technique is applied in the 
first stage of the estimation process. The technique is 
used because the number of exogenous variables exceeds the 
number of observations. Ten principal components are calcu­
lated from all the exogenous variables and are then used as 
the instrumental variables in the first stage. 
Estimation of the exchange rate component requires 
application of the grafted polynomial technique (Fuller, 
1976). As was explained in Chapter III, over the period of 
the fixed exchange rate regime (1960-1970), movements in 
the dollar exchange rate were not determined by the explanatory 
variables in the exchange rate equation as developed in Chap­
ter III. Consequently, estimation of Equation (7) in Table 
3.1 over the entire time period of analysis, is not 
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appropriate. An alternative approximation that overcomes 
this problem is to approximate discrete segments of the ex­
change rate function and then join those segments to form a 
continuous function. This function is referred to as a 
grafted polynomial. 
The application of the grafted polynomial in the esti­
mation of the mean function of the exchange rate equation 
in this study is based on the assumption that the time series 
can be divided into three segments: (1) fixed exchange rates 
(1960-1970), (2) an adjustment period (1971-1973), and (3) 
flexible rates (1974-1980). The "grafted polynomial vari­
able", z, is defined to be: 
z = 0, Year £ 1970 
z = Year-1970, 1971 < Year < 1973 
z = 4 Year ^  1974 . 
The grafted form of Equation (7) can then be represented as: 
E8US = f(z,z-MSl, z-RDYl, z-DRl, Z.MS8, Z.RDY8, Z"DR8). 
It should be noted that the estimated statistics must be 
adjusted for the degrees of freedom. This is because z is 
defined to be zero for the period 1960-1970, which removes 
the possibility of estimating any residual for each obser­
vation of the period 1960-1970. 
The estimated or structural model is shown below in 
Table 4.1. Each equation includes the estimated coefficients, 
t-statistics (parentheses), elasticities of major variables 
Table 4.1. Estimated model of the world coarse grain market 
(1) QPCRNl^ = YLDCRN1*AHCRN1^ 
(2) QPSORl^ 5 YLDS0R1*AHS0R1^ 
(3) QPBARl 5 YLDBAR1^*AHBAR1^ 
(4) QPOATl^ E YLD0AT1^*AH0AT1^ 
(5) QPl^ 5 QPCRNl^ + QPSORl^ + APBARl^ + QPOATl^ 
(6) AHCRNl^ = -2.259 + 0.889*APCRNl^ 
(-1.02) (29.39) 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.9806 DW = 1.40 
(7) AHSORl^ = -0.779 + 0.837*APSORl^ 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.6962 DW = 1.13 
(8) AHBARl. = 1.434 + 0.767*APBARl 
(3.27) (18.55) 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.9527 DW = 1.04 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
(9) AHOATl = -1.929 + 0.837*APOATl 
^ (-2.93) (26.99) 
D.F. =17 = 0.9771 DW = 1.63 
LFPCRNl 
(10) APCRNl = 30.76 + 12.46*^^^2^^ 
(1.75) (1.46) t 
[0.08] 
LFPSOBl EDRC 









D.F. =12 R^ = 0.966 DW = 2.06 
O 
a \  
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
USAPPRSS 
(11) APSORl^ = 24.95 + 3.921*-
"t ' ' LFPWHTl^ 
(6.36) (2.05) 
[0.229] 
-5.466*EDRS - 0.008*ESRCOT 
(-2.82) ^ (-4.32) 
[-0.636] [-0.289] 
+2.326*DUM661 - .07*10~^*YEAR 
(3.11) (-1.56) 
D.F. =13 R^ = .7595 DW = 1.85 
USAPPRBB 
(12) APBARl^ = 114.1 + 5.583*. t ' ' LFPOATl 
(4.13) (3.57) 
[0.503] 
+ .15*10~^*ADWHT1 - 1.766*DUMW 
(5.07) ^ (-4.39) 
+ 0.016*TIME2 - 2.701*YEAR 
(2.99) (-3.46) 




Table 4.1 (Continued) 
USAPPROO 
(13) APOATl^ = 253.5 + 6.47*^^,2^^1, 
(3.05) (1.50) 
[0.282] 
- 6  
+ 0.07*10 *ADWHT1 + 4.814*DUM681 
(1.74) (3.00) 
+ 0.033*TIME2 - 5.798*YEAR 
(2.25) (-2.62) 
D.F. =13 R^ = .9783 DW = 1.84 
(14) LFPCRNl = -1.284 + 0.935*CWP1 
(-0.82) (45.03) 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.9917 DW = 1.99 
(15) USAPPRSS = -22.47 + 1.05*CWPl , 
^ (-6.08) (21.43) ^ ^  
D.F, =17 = 0.964 DW = 1.62 
(16) USAPPRBB = -29.33 + 1.259*CWP1 
(-5.26) (17.04) ^ ^  
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.9438 DW = 1.86 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
(17) USAPPROO = -0.13 + 0.87*CWP1 -, 
(-0.02) (11.17) 
D.F. = 17 R^ =0.8782 DW = 1.44 
CWPl WPSOMl 




+74.80*cpii + 0.493*GCAU1^ 
(4.05) (1.94) 
[0.924] [1.05] 
D.F. =15 R^ = 0.9332 DW = 2.03 
CWPl 
(19) NFDl^ = 93.89 - 0.171*^^2x1 0.64*NFDl^_j^ 
(2.63) (-1.66) (3.35) 
[-0.595] 
+ 0.021*TIME2 - 2.727*YEAR 
( 2 . 6 8 )  ( - 2 . 6 6 )  
D.F. =14 R^ = 0.9919 DW = 2.86 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
CWPl 
(20) EIl^ = 23.24 + 0.165*QP1^ - 17.16*cpii 




D.F. =15 = 0.9155 DW = 1.76 
(21) LE8US^ = 5.887 - 0.802*2^ - C.165*Z^*LMSl^ 
(330.527)^1.115) (-0.735) 
[-0.17] 
-0.104*Z^*LDR1^ + 0.168*Z^*LMS8^ 
(-4.073) (0.889) 
[-0.104] [0.017] 
+ 0.016*Z *LDR8 
(2.776) ^ ^ • 
[0.061] 
D.F. =4 R^ = 0.9789 DW = 2.54 
(22) E8US^ = EXP(LE8US^) 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
_g WPCRN8 









D.F, =14 R^ = 0.9754 DW = 1.62 
(24) WPCRN8^ = 119.3 + 1.241*E8US^*CWP1^ 
(1.84) (9.83) 
[1.05] 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.8460 DW = 1.52 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 






D.F. =16 R^ = 0.7359 DW = 1.41 
CWPl 
(26) PRICEIO^ - PRGOLD78^ 
NPRCRN2. 










D.F. =14 R^ = 0.8639 DW = 2.42 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
NPRGSM2 
(28) NXTSGM2^ = 0.0197*^^^^.^ + 0 .672*QPSGM2^ 
(0.71) (10.64) 
[0.210] [0.130] 
+ 1.59*QISGM2 - 0.016*YEAR 
(0.98) (-1.33) 
D.F. =15 R^ = 0.9584 DW = 1.24 
(29) NPRCRN2^ = -0.34*10^ + 1.117*10^*E2 JA^*V7PCRN8^ 
(-1.16) (24.14) 
[1.237] 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.9716 DW = 1.82 
(30) NPRSGM2^ = -0.34*10^ + 0.959*10^*E2JA^*WPCRN8^ 
(-1.11) (19.76) 
[1.263] 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.9581 DW = 1.66 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
BARWP3 PL3 
(31) NXT3^ = 1.805*=:==r5—- " 9.304* 
t DEF3^ DEF3^ 
(2.19) (-4.93) 
[1.307] [-4.567] 
+ 0.37*QP3^ + 0.387*BI3^ 
(7.60) (2.24) 
[3.157] 
D.F. =15 = 0.8596 DW = 2.23 
(32) BARWP3^ = 3.427 + 0.777*E3JA^*WPCRN8^ 
(0.61) (14.83) 
[0.804] 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.9278 DW = 1.29 
CGP4 
(33) NXT4^ = -3.719 + 0.986*^^^^^ 
(-3.93) (1.89) 
[0.769] 
+ 0.288*QP4 + 0.814*BI4 
(3.96) ^ (2.36) t 
[0.693] 
M 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
Cont. 




2 D.F. =14 R = 0. 8398 DW = 1.96 
(34) CGP4 = -7.563 + 0.929*E4JA 
(-0.84) (8.61) 
[1.168] 
D.F. =17 r2 = 0.8116 DW = 1.47 
(35) NXT5 = 0.499*QP5 + 0.068*BI5. 
^ (4.75) ^ (1.81) ^ 
[1.727] 
GNP 5 t 
-0.107* DEF5 t 
(-1.75) 
[-0.704] 
D.F. =16 = 0.8521 DW = 1.92 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
EXPRCRN6 









D.F. =14 R^ = 0.9584 DW = 2.47 
(37) EXPRCRN6 = -103.4 + 0.969*E6JA*WPCRN8 
(-1.23)(1.61) t 
[1.05] 
D.F. =17 R^ = 0.9704 DW = 1.43 
(38) NXTI^ = (QPl^+BIl^) - (FDl^+NFDl^+EIl^+SEEDCl^ 
Table 4.1 (Continued) 
(39) NXTl^ = (NMT8^+NMT10^+NMTREST^) -
(NXTCRN2^+NXTSGM2^+NXT3^+NXT4^+NXT5^+NXT6^) 
Table 4.2. Variables used in the world coarse grain market, variable names, descriptions, 
units, and data sources 
Name Description Unit Source 
List of endogenous variables : 
QPCRNl^ U.S. corn production, Oct./Sept. 
QPSORl^ U.S. sorghum production, Oct./Sept. 
QPBARl^ U.S. barley production, June/May 
QPOATl^ U.S. oat production, June/May 
AHCRNl^ U.S. com acreage harvested, Oct./Sept. 
AHSORl^ U.S. sorghum acreage harvested, Oct./Sept. 
AHBARl^ U.S. barley acreage harvested, June/May 
AHOATl^ U.S. oat acreage harvested, June/May 
APCRNl^ U.S. com acreage planted, Oct./Sept. 
APSORl^ U.S. sorghum acreage planted, Oct./Sept. 
APBARl^ U.S. barley acreage planted, June/May 
APOATl U.S. oat acreage planted, June/May 
million metric tons MSDB, 1982 
million metric tons MSDB, 1982 
million metric tons MSDB, 1982 
million metric tons MSDB, 1982 
million acres MSDB, 1982 
million acres MSDB, 1982 
million acres MSDB, 1982 
million acres MSDB, 1982 
million acres MSDB, 1982 
million acres MSDB, 1982 
million acres MSDB, 1982 
million acres MSDB, 1982 
For complete reference, see bibliography. 
Modeling system data bank. 
Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Name Description Unit Source 
FDl. U.S. coarse grain consumption as feed, 
Oct./Sept. 
million metric tons USDA, FAC , 
1976a-1982a 
NFDl^ U.S. industrial coarse grain 
consumption, Oct./Sept. 
million metric tons USDA-FAC, 
1976a-1982a 
Ell. U.S. coarse grain inventory, Oct./Sept. million metric tons USDA-FAC, 
1976a-1982a 
QPl^ U.S. coarse grain production, Oct./Sept. million metric tons USDA-FAC, 
1976a-1982a 




U.S. annual exchange rate, period average Jap. yen/US $ 




WPCRN8^ Japan wholesale corn price, Apr./Mar. yen/MT 




PRGOLD78^ U.S. gold price, calendar year U.S. $/ounce IMF-IFS, 1981 
"U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Circular. 
International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, 
Table 4.2 (Continued) 












U.S. coarse grain price in gold 
Argentina net corn exports. Mar./Feb. 
Argentina net sorghum exports. Mar./Feb. 
Argentina wholesale corn price, Mar./Feb. 
ounces/MT 
million metric tons 
million metric tons 
pesos/MT 
Argentina wholesale sorghum price. Mar./Feb. pesos/MT 
Canada net coarse grain exports, July/June million metric tons 
Canada wholesale barley price, Aug./July 
Australia net coarse grain exports, July/ 
June 
Can. $/MT 
million metric tons 
Australia unit value of coarse grain export Aust. $/MT 
South Africa net coarse grain exports, 
July/June 
Thailand net coarse grain exports, 
July/June 
million metric tons 





Gogna y Cia, 1983 











Data provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture from unpublished sources. 
Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Name Description 
EXPRCRNS^ Thailand corn export price, calendar year 
NXTl^ U.S. coarse grain exports, July/June 
CWPl^ U.S. consumption weighted price of the 
U.S. coarse grain farm prices 
LFPCRNl^ Lag of U.S. farm price of corn in period 
t, Oct./Sept. 
USAPPRSS^ U.S. effective support rate of sorghum 
up to 1972 and lag of farm price of 
sorghum thereafter, Oct./Sept. 
USAPPRBB^ U.S. effective support rate of barley 
up to 1972 and lag of farm price 
of barley thereafter, June/May 
USAPPROO^ U.S. effective support rate of oats up to 
1972 and lag of farm price of oat there­
after, June/May 
List of exogenous variables ; 
YLDCRNl^ U.S. com yield, Oct./Sept. 
YLDSORl^ U.S. sorghum yield, Oct./Sept. 
Unit Source 
baht/MT 












Womack et al 
1975 
MSDB, 1982; 
Womack et al 
1976 
MSDB, 1982; 






Table 4.2 (Continued) 













U.S. barley yield, June/May 
U.S. oat yield, June/May 
Lag of U.S. farm price of soybeans in 
period t, Aug./July 
U.S. effective diversion rate of corn, 
Oct./Sept. 
U.S. effective support rate 
of com, Oct./Sept. 
U.S. com acreage planted in period 
t-1, Oct./Sept. 
Index of U.S. prices paid by farmers 
for all commodities used in production 
* 
Time trend 
Lag of U.S. farm price of wheat in period 
t, July/June 






















U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Prices. 
Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Name Description 
ESRCOT^ U.S. effective support rate of cotton, 
Aug./July 
DUM661^ Dummy variable representing change in 
calculation of effective support rates 





U.S. wheat acreage diverted, July/June 
Dummy variable reflecting bad weather 
conditions 
Dummy variable to account for quadratic 
time trend 





Lag of IPPFl^ in period t 
Dummy variable to reflect the influence 




Lag of consumption weighted price of the 
U.S. coarse grains farm prices 
WPSOMl. U.S. wholesale soymeal price, Oct./Sept. 
Unit Source 
US $/MT 
(1960-65) = 0 
(otherwise) = 1 
U.S. $/MT 
MSDB, 1902 




(1965, 1972, 1977) = 




(1960-1967) = 0 
(otherwise) = 1 
MSDB, 1982 
1 
Womack et al., 
1976 
MSDB, 1982 
USDA, AGP, 1980b 






















U.S. consumer price index 
Index of producer price of U.S. livestock 
and products 
U.S. number of grain consuming animal 
units, annual 
U.S. wholesale price index 
U.S. government coarse grain inventory, 
Oct./Sept. 
Log of U.S. money supply (M2) 
Log of U.S. discount rate 
Log of Japan money supply (M2) 
Log of Japan discount rate 
Dummy variable reflecting the shift to 
flexible exchange rates 
Japan soymeal wholesale price, Apr./Mar. 
Japan wholesale general price index 




1980 = 1.0 
million head 
1980 = 1.0 





(1960-1970) = 0 
(otherwise) = 1 
Yen/MT 
















Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Name Description 
RICEFEDS^ Japan rice fed to animals, Apr./Mar. 
RDYIO, USSR real income 
QPIO^ USSR coarse grain production, July/June 
WGPI2^ Argentina general wholesale price index, 
calendar year 
QPCRN2^ Argentina corn production. Mar./Feb. 
QPSGM2^ Argentina sorghum production. Mar./Feb. 
QISGM2 Argentina sorghum beginning inventory. 
Mar./Feb. 
PL3^ Canada weighted average price of livestock, 
calendar year 
DEF3^ Canada implicit price deflator 
QP3^ Canada coarse grain production, 
July/June 
BI3^ Canada beginning coarse grain inventory, 
July/June 
DEF4^ Australia implicit price deflator, calendar 
year 
Central Intelligence Agency. 
Unit Source 
1000 metric tons 
billions of 1980 
U.S. dollar 
million metric tons 
1960 = 1.0 
million metric tons 
million metric tons 
million metric tons 
Can. $/CWT 
1980 = 1.0 
million metric tons 
million metric tons 





Gogna y Cia, 
1983 
Gogna y Cia, 1983 
Gogna y Cia, 1983 








Table 4.2 (Continued) 








Australia coarse grain production, 
July/June 
million metric tons 
Australia beginning coarse grain inventory, million metric tons 
July/June 
Australia grain consuming animal units 1000 head 
million metric tons South Africa coarse grain production, 
Oct./Sept. 
South Africa gross national product, 
calendar year 
South Africa implicit price deflator, 
calendar year 
million rand 
1980 = 1.0 
















Thailand consumer price index, calendar 
year 
Thailand gross national product, 
calendar year 
Thailand total coarse grain supply, 
production and beginning inventory 
U.S. coarse grain seed consumption, 
Oct./Sept. 
1980 = 1.0 
billion baht 
million metric tons 







Table 4.2 (Continued) 
Name Description Unit Source 
BIl. U.S. beginning coarse grain inventory, 
Oct./Sept. 
NMTREST^ Rest of the world net imports of coarse 
grain, July/June 
E2JA^ Argentina exchange rate, calendar year, 
period average 
E3JA^ Canada exchange rate, calendar year, 
period average 
E4JA^ Australia exchange rate, calendar year, 
period average 
E6JA^ Thailand exchange rate, calendar year, 
period average 
Z Grafted polynomial variable to join 
fixed to flexible exchange rate 
million metric tons 

















(brackets), R-square, Durbin-Watson or Durbin h-statistic. 
Any interpretation concerning elasticities is done only 
sparingly in this analysis because derivatives are not 
strictly valid in such simultaneous models. Table 4.2 pro­
vides the variable names, descriptions, units, and sources 
of all time series used to estimate the model. 
Equations (1-20) and (38) in Table 4.1 present the U.S. 
model. The coarse grain acreage planted equation, as speci­
fied in the last chapter (Table 3.1), had poor statistical 
properties. Therefore, Equation (3) in Table 3.1 was dis­
aggregated. The estimated equations for acreage planted of 
sorghum, barley, and oats were specified in a manner simi­
lar to the theoretical model presented by Womack et al. 
(1976). The corn acreage Equation (10) in Table 4.1 features 
the lag of farm prices of corn and soybeans, the current year's 
effective support and diversion prices, and the lag of corn 
acreage planted. The statistical properties of this equation 
are good with almost 9 7 percent of historical variation in 
corn acreage explained; all variables have the correct sign 
and are significant at the 10 percent level. Corn acreage 
responds significantly to corn diversion policy as measured 
by the effective diversion rate. Acreage response is 
fairly inelastic with respect to corn and soybean prices. 
Results confirm the dominance of soybeans as a corn acreage 
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substitute. Lag acreage is significant at the 10 percent 
level which indicates gradual adjustments to changing market 
conditions. 
Sorghum acreage estimates are presented in Equation (11), 
Table 4.1. Commodities that complete for sorghum land are 
wheat and cotton. These two influences are captured in 
lagged wheat market price (LFPWHTl) and effective support 
price of cotton (ESRCOT). Following Houck et al. (1972), 
supply-inducing prices enter through a "spliced" variable 
(USAPPRSS) which is defined to be the effective support 
price of sorghum prior to 197 2 and lagged farm price there­
after. Effective diversion payment rates are included in 
EDRS. A change in the method of calculating effective 
support prices after 1965 is reflected in DUM661. All 
variables have correct signs and the R-squared is reasonable. 
Barley planted acreage response. Equation (12) in 
Table 4.1, is similar in specification to the sorghum equa­
tions. Competitive influence enters from oats and wheat with 
corresponding variable influence represented by their 
respective lagged farm prices (LFPOATl and ADWHTl). Also, a 
"spliced" market price variable (USAPPRBB) is utilized for 
government influence prior to 1972 and lagged farm price since 
1972. The quadratic and linear time trend (TIME2 and YEAR) 
are used to capture technological influence from introduction 
of chemical herbicides. The dummy variable (DUMW) captures 
the influence of bad weather on planting. The statistical 
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properties of this equation are quite good, with almost 9 0 
percent of historical variation explained; all variables have 
the correct sign and are significant at .05 percent with 
the exception of TIME2 which is significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
The planted oat acreage response, Equation (13) in 
Table 4.1, is again similar in specification to the other 
minor coarse grain equations. All variables have the correct 
sign and are significant at the 5 percent level with the 
exception of the "spliced" price variable (significant at 
the 15 percent level. Results indicate that the price 
elasticities of minor grains are somewhat larger than 
for corn, ranging from .503 for barley to .08 for corn. 
Equations (14-17) in Table 4.1 relate farm prices of 
the individual grains to the lagged consumption weighted 
average price of coarse grain (CWPl). 
Equations (18, 19, 20) in Table 4.1 present the U.S. 
demands for coarse grain. Except the nonfeed demand, the 
equations are similar to their specification in Equations 
(4, 5, 6) in Table 3.1. All lagged variables in Equation 
(18), Table 4.1, were statistically insignificant and were 
dropped. All other variables are highly significant with 
the correct signs. The feed demand is inelastic, reflecting 
the impediments to rapid adjustments by livestock pro­
ducers. However, the livestock price elasticity of feed 
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demand is almost one. The feed demand is elastic with respect 
to the number of grain consuming units (GCAUl). Because 
GCAUl is highly correlated with income, this might reflect 
the high income elasticity of the U.S. feed demand. 
The nonfeed U.S. coarse grain demand as specified by 
Equation (5) in Table 3.1 produced wrong signs; a negative 
sign for all variables. The perverse signs can likely be 
explained by the developments in the sugar market. Over 
the past decade, the high price of sugar, brought about an 
induced technological innovation to substitute corn fructose 
(a coarse grain product) for sugar. The combination of 
slowly but exponentially growing technology and the high 
sugar price account for the perverse signs. 
Equation (19) in Table 4.1 specifies the U.S. nonfeed 
demand as a function of real coarse grain price, a lagged 
dependent variable, and a quadratic time trend variable. The 
equation has good statistical properties; all variables have 
the right sign and are significant with the exception of 
price (significant at the 10 percent level). 
The presence of a lagged dependent variable in this 
equation, as well as others, could lead to autocorrelation. 
However, the Durbin h-statistics of these equations are not 
calculated for two reasons: (1) Johnston (1972) indicates 
that the h-statistic is only a large sample test (n>30) and 
nothing is known about its small-sample properties, and (2) 
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Taylor and Wilson (cited in Johnston, 1972) provide exten­
sive evidence that even in inappropriate situations, the DW 
test is still a powerful detector of serial correlation 
problems. 
In the light of past historical difficulty in esti­
mating stock equations, the statistical properties of the 
U.S. inventory demand (20), in Table 4.1, are excellent. 
All explanatory variables have the correct sign and are 
significant at the .05 percent level. Estimated price 
elasticity is (-0.728), suggesting the presence of a specu­
lative component in private demand for coarse grain. 
The U.S. exchange rate is shown as Equation (20), 
Table 4.1. The equation is estimated in the double log 
form. Except for real income variables, the equation is 
identical to the grafted polynomial equation developed 
earlier in this chapter. The estimation of the original 
equation produced unexpected signs for the income variables 
and were consequently dropped from the specification. Al­
most 9 8 percent of the historical variation in the exchange 
rate is explained. The interest rate variables are highly 
significant. However, their elasticities are low and almost 
equal (0.4), in absolute value, for the period 1974-1980. 
The money supply variables remain in the equation despite 
their statistical insignificance. The money supply elastici­
ties of the exchange rate are low and identical (0.68) , in 
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absolute value, for the period 1974-1980. 
Japan's net coarse grain import demand is presented as 
Equation (23) in Table 4.1. Because Japan's coarse grain 
imports are corn dominated, and because barley imports are 
handled by the Japanese government, the corn price is 
taken to reflect the coarse grain price. The estimation of 
the original specification of the Japanese net coarse grain 
import demand, Equation (8), Table 3.1, produced statistical­
ly insignificant coefficients for current production and 
beginning inventory. This reflects Japan's extreme de­
pendence on the international coarse grain market (100 percent 
of consumption). The statistical properties of the final 
specification are quite good with almost 97 percent of the 
variation explained; all variables have the correct sign at 
the 5 percent level. 
The Japan price linkage Equation (24) in Table 5.2 
meets the theoretical expectation given in Chapter III. The 
intercept is significant, reflecting the presence of the 
transportation cost and perhaps other additive factors such 
as specific taxes and subsidies in the world market. The 
slope is not significantly different from one. The esti­
mated "price transmission elasticity" is 1.05, suggesting 
a perfect transmission of the changes in the world market 
condition. 
The USSR net coarse grain import demand is shown as 
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Equation (25) in Table 4.1. The USSR grain consuming animal 
units (GCAUlO) could not be located, and were therefore 
dropped from the original specification. The statistical 
properties of the estimated equation are good, in spite of 
the relatively low R-square. All coefficients are signifi­
cant at the 5 percent level with the exception of current 
production (significant at the 10 percent level). The price 
elasticity (-1.106) confirms the CIA's 1979 report that 
with the USSR's growing import quantities and foreign ex­
change shortage, the demand is expected to be elastic. The 
income elasticity (7.161) reflects the rising real income and 
stable prices which influence the demand for meat by consumers 
in the USSR. 
Equation (26) is the calculated price linkage of "the 
USSR coarse grain price". This specification affected the 
simulation results perversely as explained more fully in 
Appendix B. As a result, an alternative specification of the 
USSR price linkage was used to estimate and simulate the 
model. The details of the alternative specification 
are given in Appendix B. 
Equations (27-30) report Argentina's trading behavior. 
The original net trade Equation (12) in Table 3.1 resulted 
in perverse statistical results. The major problem was 
the unavailability of the appropriate data. For example, 
data for national income, livestock price, and grain con­
suming animal units could not be found. In addition, with 
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currency redefinitions (twice during the sample period, 
1960-1980) and the compound rate of inflation around 67 
percent for the same period, the quality of the available 
data is highly questionable. 
Argentina's net coarse grain import demand is dis­
aggregated to account for various Argentinian governmental 
policies affecting the corn and sorghum markets (the primary 
coarse grains). Equations (27) and (28) in Table 4.1 re­
port the net export supply equations of corn and sorghum. 
The equations are statistically satisfactory. All coeffi­
cients are significant with the exception of sorghum price. 
The sorghum price is left in despite its lack of statistical 
significance because it does have the correct sign. 
Equations (29) and (30) in Table 4.1 are the price 
suggest that Argentina permits world coarse grain market 
price adjustments to be reflected in its domestic coarse 
grain markets. The estimated elasticities in both equations 
are greater than one, suggesting a perfect price trans­
mission of the world price. 
The estimated Canadian net coarse grain export supply 
is given by Equation (31) in Table 4.1. Because the 
Canadian coarse grain market is barley dominated, the barley 
price is used as the coarse grain price. The grain con­
suming animal units (GCAU3) and the intercept were sta­
tistically insignificant and were therefore dropped. All 
other estimated parameters are significant at the 5 percent 
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level. Although the Canadian export supply is elastic, the 
coarse grain production and livestock sector (livestock 
price) show greater influence on exports than the own price. 
The estimated Canadian price linkage equation is shown 
in Equation (32), Table 4.1. The coefficient of the world 
price in Canadian dollars (E3JA.APCRN8) is significant at 
.01 percent. The elasticity, however, is smaller than one. 
This was expected because, as discussed in Chapter II, the 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is the sole exporting agency for 
Canadian coarse grain. In addition, the CWB has also been 
the major domestic marketing agency for grains in general. 
Equation (33) in Table 4.1 represents the estimated 
Australian net coarse grain exports. The price variable 
used is the trade weighted average of the unit export values 
of barley and sorghum. The estimation of the original 
specification, Equation (16) in Table 3.1, produced in­
significant coefficients for soymeal and livestock prices and 
were therefore, dropped. The statistical properties of 
Equation (33) in Table 4.1 are good. All coefficients are 
significant at the 5 percent level except the price, which 
is significant at the 8 percent level. Again, the livestock 
sector appears to have more influence on trade than has the 
own price. 
Equation (34) in Table 4.1 is the Australian price 
linkage equations. The slope is significant at the .01 
137 
percent level and is consistent with the expected world price 
transmission elasticity given in Chapter II. Domestic prices 
of Australian barley and sorghum move closely with the world 
price for reasons given in Chapter II. 
The South African net coarse grain export equation is 
shown as Equation (36) in Table 4.1. Data for grain con­
suming animal units in South Africa are not available. 
Therefore, real income was used instead. Estimation of the 
original specification produced insignificant own and live­
stock price coefficients and was therefore, dropped. The 
final Equation (35) in Table 4.1 has good statistical prop­
erties. All coefficients are statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level. Current production appears to have 
influenced the trading behavior more than the other explana­
tory variables. This was expected for policy reasons given 
in Chapter II. The South African price linkage equation 
also had insignificant intercept and slope. Again, this 
was expected for the policy reasons given in Chapter II. 
Equations (36) in Table 4.1 represents Thailand's 
net coarse grain export supply. The price variable used is 
the corn export price, Thailand's primary coarse grain. 
Because of the inavailability of data, real income is used 
in place of the grain consuming animal units. Estimation 
of the original specification. Equation (20) in Table 3.1, 
produced insignificant soymeal and livestock price coeffi-
138 
cients and consequently, these variables were dropped. The 
final estimated Equation (36) in Table 4.1, includes a time 
trend variable. The statistical properties of this equation 
are quite good with almost 96 percent of historical variation 
in corn acreage explained; all variables have the correct 
sign and are significant at the .5 percent level with the 
exception of the price (significant at the 13 percent level). 
This is not surprising because over 70 percent of Thailand's 
coarse grain exports are covered by long-term contracts. 
Current coarse grain production and price elasticities are 
1.0 0 and 0.266, respectively, suggesting that coarse grain 
exports are restricted more by the current production than 
by price. 
Thailand's price linkage Equation (37) is reported 
in Table 4.1. The estimated price transmission coefficient 
is significant at the .01 percent level. The estimated 
"price transmission elasticity" is one, confirming the 
theoretical expectation. As was explained in Chapter II, 
the export prices have been based on the "world coarse 
grain price". 
Validation of the Model 
This section is concerned mainly with the performance 
and stability of the model. In general, there are no 
definite rules for measuring these two attributes of a 
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model. The judgment on the performance of any model is 
largely subjective. 
The "goodness" of the model can be determined by the 
validity of its estimates, its ability to reproduce the 
actual data in a dynamic simulation, and its stability. The 
estimated coefficients are reasonable when judged by eco­
nomic theory and when compared to the estimated values of 
other studies. Most equations have a high R-square. Two 
out of 31 behavioral equations have positively correlated 
errors. They are the U.S. acreage harvested equations of 
two minor coarse grains, sorghum and barley, which are not 
the focus of this study. The remaining 29 consist of 17 
equations with no serial correlation problems and 12 
equations falling in the indeterminant range of the Durbin-
Watson test. Given the size of the model, the validity 
of these estimates is satisfactory. 
In order to measure the model's ability to repli­
cate history, the model is simulated over the period 
(1962-1980), given the first year data (1962). The simu­
lation result is then compared to the observed data. 
The statistics measuring the model's simulation per­
formance include residual mean square (RMS) error, RMS per­
cent error, and Theil's forecast statistics. 
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= simulation estimate of observation in time t; 
= actual value of observation in time t; 
n = number of observations 
This statistic measures the average error of the simu­
lated values from the actual values. The period by period 
deviation of the simulation variable from its actual time 
path can be measured by RMS error. The size of RMS error is 
dependent upon the variable size and is thus difficult to 
interpret. To eliminate this problem, RMS percent error 
is often used instead. It is defined as follows: 
Theil's statistics are also often used to measure 
simulation performance of a model. There are 3 different 
components; UM (bias error), UR (regression error), and UD 
(disturbance error). These components are derived from the 
following model, suggested by Cohen and Cyert (1961); 
t=l t 
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Y t a + bY t + U t 
where Y^ and Y^ are defined as before and is a random 
error term distributed normally and identically with zero 
mean and constant variance. 
If a = 0 and b = 1, then the forecast will be un­
biased since E(Y^) = E(Y^). 
The forecast will be biased if it underestimates or 
overestimates its corresponding actual values systematically. 
This will occur if either a 0 or b ^ 1. 
If a = 0 and b = 1, the forecast will be both un­
biased and efficient, in the mean square error sense. The 
mean square error can be decomposed as follows: 
MSE = i . E (Y.-Y.) 
t=l ^ ^ 
2 
(Y-Y)2 + (b-1) 
t=l 
UM + UR + UD. 
Where Y and Y are the means of the observed and simulated 
values. 
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1 2 Therefore, if a = 0 and b = 1, then MSE = — EU., 
t=l 
which is the smallest possible MSE. 
Table 4.3 presents RMS errors and RMS percent error. 
Table 4.4 presents Theil's forecast statistics. Most 
endogenous variables have reasonable RMS percent errors 
less than 0.20. Out of 41 endogenous variables, the 19 
following variables have high RMS errors; these are; 
CWPl, USAPPROO, USAPPRSS, USAPPRBB, LFPCRNl, NXTl, 
WPCRN8, NMT8, PRICEIO, MMTlO, NPRCRN2, NPRSGM2, NXTCRN2, 
NXTSGM2, BARWP3, NXT3, CGP4, NXTY, NXT5. The RMS percent 
error statistics portray the nature of the world coarse 
grain market unequivocally. As the estimated elasticities 
reported earlier in this chapter indicate, the world 
excess coarse grain demand is fairly inelastic. This was, 
of course, expected for the policy reasons given in Chapter 
II; the major coarse grain importing nations of the world 
are made up of developed nations which are highly protective 
of their markets. For this reason, any small simulation 
error results in large price volatility, which is then 
transmitted more to the domestic markets of the regions 
with larger price elasticities. 
This portion of the RMS errors can be eliminated 
through a number of techniques. One technique applied by 
Huyser (1983) in her world soybean and soymeal model is 
to force in a price elasticity for the rest of world 
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Table 4.3. Residual mean errors of the base simulation 
Variable^ Statistics of Fit 
RMS Error RMS % Error 
NXT5 554624 0.658668 
USAPPROO 17.6725 0.396815 
USAPPRBB 25.7109 0.884919 
USAPPRSS 21.7876 0.798556 
LFPCRNl 18.1216 0.390464 
LE8US 0.0280084 0.00494501 
APCATl 2736299 0.12125 
APBARl 2329748 0.216666 
APSORl 1944880 0.114925 
APCRNl 2881431 0.0432271 
LOGPR 0.137307 0.0314444 
E8US 8.23531 0.0281292 
AHOATl 2348596 0.143724 
2\HBAR1 1845984 0.190406 
AHSORl 1827758 0.143489 
AHCRNl 2792126 0.0491542 
PRGOLD78 13.5654 0.128336 
QPOATl 1655133 0.143724 
QPBARl 1631700 0.190406 
QPSORl 2299395 0.143489 
QPCRNl 5246444 0.0491542 
QPl 9785109 0.0701836 
NFDl 445181 0.0352425 
CWPl 19.4486 0.382534 
WPCRNB 8169.04 0.350001 
NMT8 1683168 0.30908 
Ell 8623471 0.19881 
NMTIO 4589297 3.53681 
NPRCRN2 1025223 23.8776 
PRICEIO 0.538422 0.409532 
NXTCRN2 28322600 9.28922 
NXTSGM2 16645045 50.3525 
BARWP3 21.79 0.399239 
NXT3 1174261 2.21407 
CGP4 24.5984 0 .494626 
NXT4 860486 1.06359 
NPRSGM2 1145988 33.1528 
EXPRCRN6 500.674 0.401793 
NXT6 184626 0.17654 
NXTl 38724845 2.00063 
FDl 23807203 0.216878 
^See Table 4.2 for variable name definitions. 
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Regress Disturb. Accuracy 
MSE (UM) (UR) (UD) (Ul) 
NXT5 0.179429 0.10 0.33 0.57 0 .0000 
USAPPROO 0.152319 0.43 0.39 0 .18 0 .0058 
USAPPRBB 0.736089 0.36 0.53 0.11 0 .0122 
USAPPRSS 0.604789 0.37 0.53 0.09 0 .0129 
LFPCRNl 0.152308 0.38 0.39 0.23 0 .0055 
LE 8 US 0.0000241 0.00 0.00 1.00 0 .0009 
APOATl 0.0127039 0.32 0.38 0.30 0 .0000 
APBARl 0.0400029 0 . 33 0.46 0.21 0 .0000 
APSORl 0.0129449 0.32 0.30 0.38 0 .0000 
APCRNl 0.00176206 0.31 0.02 0.67 0 .0000 
LOGPR 0.00123409 0.00 0.01 0.99 0 .0078 
E8US 0.00073163 0.00 0.00 1.00 0 .0001 
AHOATl 0.0177643 0.30 0.35 0.35 0 .0000 
AHBARl 0.031793 0.32 0.42 0 .25 0 .0000 
AHSORl 0.0196536 0.23 0.40 0.38 0 .0000 
AHCRNl 0.00223517 0.27 0.06 0.67 0 .0000 
PRGOLD78 0.049749 0.00 0.00 0.99 0 .0011 
QPOATl 0.0187504 0.28 0.14 0.58 0 .0000 
QPBARl 0.0350005 0.31 0.39 0.30 0 .0000 
QPSORl 0.0216157 0.22 0.33 0 .45 0 .0000 
QPCRNl 0.00233992 0.27 0.01 0.72 0 .0000 
QPl 0.00473162 0.32 0.07 0.61 0 .0000 
NFDl 0.0013021 0.39 0.37 0 .25 0 .0000 
CWPl 0.147124 0.37 0 .41 0.22 0 .0047 
WPCRN8 0.136865 0.39 0.39 0.21 0 . 0000 
NMT8 0.203207 0.19 0.76 0 .05 0 .0000 
Ell 0.0387473 0.17 0.20 0.62 0 .0000 
NMTIO 6.0582 0.43 0.33 0.24 0 .0000 
NPRCRN2 812.306 0.45 0.52 0.03 0 .0000 
PRICEIO 0.158009 0.33 0.46 0.21 0 .3599 
NXTCRN2 89.4151 0.37 0.63 0.00 0 .0000 
NXTSGM2 2274.59 0.27 0.72 0.00 0 .0000 
BARWP3 0.148538 0.36 0.42 0 .22 0 .0044 
NXT3 392.407 0.05 0.95 0.00 0 .0000 
CGP4 0.250498 0.36 0.40 0.24 0 .0069 
NXT4 1.54449 0.39 0.51 0.11 0 .0000 
NPRSGM2 1499.05 0.45 0.54 0.01 0 .0000 
EXPRCRN6 0.17802 0.40 0.41 0.19 0 .0002 
NXT6 0.0394524 0.19 0.12 0.68 0 .0000 
NXTl 4.80075 0.39 0.60 0.01 0 .0000 
FDl 0.047031 0.38 0.49 0.13 0 .0000 
^See Table 4.2 for variable name definitions. 
146 
import demand equations. However, it is not clear that 
this procedure would reflect the true structure of the world 
coarse grain market. 
In addition, variables with small absolute values pro­
duce a high proportion of errors for any small changes 
in value. All Argentina variables, for example, have 
large RMS percent error because of their relatively small 
magnitudes and the contrast in the magnitude of variables 
during the beginning and the end of the studied period. 
Theil's forecast errors of simulation variables are 
presented in Table 4.4. The statistics are weighted so 
that all the three components of MSE sum to 1.0. The same 
variables which have high RMS percent errors (mentioned 
earlier) , have high URs also. The .same explanation, as in 
the case when they have high RMS percent errors, is also 
applied here. In addition, the fact that the livestock 
sector is exogenous may contribute to the size of the RMS 
percent errors, because coarse grain is primarily used by 
livestock producers. The importance of the livestock 
sector is evident from the elasticities and the statistical 
significance of the exogenous livestock related variables 
reported in the previous section. 
Another measure of model performance is the extent 
to which turning points are correctly simulated. Evidence 
147 
of this model's turning point accuracy can be seen by 
looking at the key price series. The major international 
prices are the U.S. and Japan prices, and the U.S. exchange 
rate. 
For the U.S. price, there are three turning point 
errors from the 19 year dynamic simulation, which occur in 
the first three years (Figure 4.1). For the Japan price 
there are four turning point errors which occur again in 
the first four years (Figure 4.2). For the U.S. exchange 
rate, there are four turning points again, in the first 9 
years (Figure 4.3). 
The comparison of simulated values and the actual data 
is satisfactory. The model has a good ability to trace 
upward and downward movements in the data. The estimates 
are closer to the 1970s actual data than the 1960s. In the 
case where data show extreme fluctuations over time, the 
simulation results tend to be more accurate in later years 
than in the beginning of the period. 
The stability of the model is measured by its response 
to a one period exogenous shock. If the fluctuation 
response to the shock is decreasing as time passes, and 
the simulation estimates move back to the base simulated 
results over time, the model is stable. The faster the 
adjustment back toward the base simulated results, the more 
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Figure 4-3, Comparison of actual and simulated U.S. exchange 
rates 
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results of a hypothetical increase in the U.S. money supply 
in 1971. Given this shock, the simulation is rerun for 
the period of 1971 to 1980. The U.S. money supply is 
assumed to increase by 5 billion dollars. This increase 
amounts to roughly 1 percent of the U.S. money stock in 
1971. The expected immediate effect of this increase is 
a decrease in the U.S. exchange rate. The depreciation of 
the dollar would then increase the foreign demand for the 
U.S. coarse grain. This would then improve the competitive 
position of the U.S. in the world market. That is, while 
the U.S. coarse grain exports increase, the exports of the 
other exporters decrease. As a result, the U.S. coarse 
grain price would increase, which in turn would cause a 
reduction in the U.S. domestic coarse grain disappearance. 
The U.S. dollar depreciation works as a subsidy, creating 
a wedge between the domestic prices of the U.S. and other 
exporters. This would increase the U.S. share of the export 
market. As a result of a reduction in the other exporters' 
market share, the domestic coarse grain supply in those 
regions would increase pushing their domestic prices down. 
However, the dynamic effects in the following years on all 
variables depend upon the relative supply and demand 
responses to the changes in the coarse grain prices of 
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all the trading regions. 
Table 4.5 reports the dynamic simulation results. 
As expected, the increase in the U.S. money supply causes 
the U.S. dollar to depreciate by .11 percent from the base 
solution in 1971. Both U.S. coarse grain exports and prices 
increase, leading to higher export revenues. However, the 
percent increase in export is larger than the percent in­
crease in price. This implies that U.S. coarse grain export 
supply is price elastic to trading countries. U.S. coarse 
grain feed, nonfeed, and inventory demands decrease as 
the price increases. The inventory demand bears an im­
portant share of the adjustment because of its relatively 
higher price elasticity. The U.S. coarse grain production 
increases as well over time. The shock affects the fol­
lowing year's planting decision because acreage decisions 
are a one year lag process. 
Imports of Japan and the USSR increase while their 
prices decrease. However, in percentage terms, the USSR 
reacts more to the shock than Japan does. Interestingly, the 
cost of imports to the USSR increases while it decreases for 
Japan. This is because the percent increase in imports rela­
tive to percent decrease in price is higher for the USSR, 
while it is lower for Japan. 
The response of the other exporters' market conditions 
Table 4.5. Dynamic impact of a one period increase in U.S. money supply 
Year Base Change % Change Base Change % Change 
U.S. Exchange rate (yen/US $) U.S. Coarse grain price (U.S. $/MT) 
71 330.2 -0.38 -0.11 64.67 0.023 0.03 
72 308.6 -0.63 -0.20 77.36 0.037 0.04 
73 291.7 -0.83 -0.28 106.97 0.066 0.06 
74 278.5 -1.01 -0.36 126.37 0.058 0.04 
75 289.9 -0.93 -0.32 111.80 0.057 0.05 
76 306.4 —0.86 -0.28 104.41 0.050 0.04 
77 262,5 -0.67 -0.25 56.07 0.055 0.09 
78 213.4 -0.50 -0.23 110.36 0.028 0.02 
79 223.7 -0.49 -0.22 111.21 0.022 0.02 
80 221.6 -0.44 -0.20 133.30 0.027 0.02 
U.S. Coarse grain exports (1000 MT) U.S. Coarse grain nonfeed consumption (1000 MT) 
71 73784 34.30 0.04 12180 -0.34 -0.002 
72 58510 64.38 0.11 12936 -0.70 -0.005 
73 47407 103.25 0.21 13546 -1.19 -0.008 
74 54283 86.31 0.15 14243 -1.34 -0.009 
75 62035 77.90 0.12 15277 -1.41 -0.009 
76 47730 67.14 0.14 16499 -1.35 -0.008 
77 33413 67.63 0.20 18225 -1.33 -0.007 
78 57231 42.59 0.07 19490 -1.07 -0,005 
79 67528 27.08 0.04 • 20963 -0.83 -0.003 
80 66899 24.88 0.03 22451 -0.69 -0.003 
Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change 
U.S. Coarse grain nonfeed demand (1000 MT) 
71 106941 -25 -0.024 
72 132061 -39 -0.030 
73 142025 —66 -0.046 
74 89297 -53 -0.059 
75 103755 -47 -0.046 
76 114722 -39 -0.034 
77 138810 -40 -0.029 
78 130026 -19 -0.015 
79 146807 -14 -0.009 
80 117290 -14 -0.012 
U.S. Coarse grain inventory (100 MT) 
71 43489 -8.17 -0.018 
72 30683 -10.33 -0.033 
73 21878 




74 11674 -13.90 -0.119 
75 25668 -12.54 -0.048 
76 29077 -10.00 -0.034 
77 45074 -10.50 -0.023 
78 37312 -3.09 -0.008 
79 50348 -2.95 -0.005 
80 41148 -3.79 -0.009 
Base Change % Change 
U.S. Coarse grain production (1000 MT) 
206079 00. ,0 0. ,000 
189987 13. ,6 0, 007 
195406 17. ,0 0, .008 
149058 17. 9 0, .012 
192891 16. 0 0, .008 
192620 15, .9 0 .008 
206636 14. 9 0, .007 
203793 18. 8 0, .009 
240525 9, .1 0, .003 
196 399 5, .5 0 .002 
Japan coarse grain price (Yen/MT) 




29769.0 -46.50 -0.15 
38871.7 -87.35 -0.22 
43815.3 -138.38 -0.31 
40361.9 -109.07 -0.27 
39845.5 -93.43 -0.23 
18397.5 -28.84 -0.15 
29361.5 -62.00 -0.21 
31005.5 -61.78 -0.19 
36799.1 -66.82 
00 rH O 1 
Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change 
USSR Coarse grain price (ounces/MT) 
71 1.40 -0.003 -0.25 
72 1.28 -0.006 
00 o
 
73 1.48 -0.009 1 o
 
74 0.63 -0.005 -0.88 
75 0.68 -0.005 -0.77 
76 0.86 -0.005 -0.67 
77 0.32 -0.001 -0.55 






79 0.21 -0.001 -0.54 
80 0.22 -0.001 -0.49 
Argentina corn price (pesos/MT) 
71 -298997 -34 -0.01 





73 -220772 -271 -0.12 
74 -216022 -396 -0.18 
75 121667 -1252 -1.02 
76 1479346 -4270 -0.28 
77 2334380 -4195 -0.17 
78 9572061 -20934 -0.21 
79 15776383 -32117 -0.20 






Base Change % Change 
USSR Coarse grain import (LOOP MT) 
2152 21.9 1.01 
3352 37.3 1.11 
-880 59.9 6.80 
5636 33.3 0.59 
12234 31.8 0.26 
2789 35.2 1.26 







14443 6.8 0.04 
14890 6.8 0.04 
Japan coarse grain import (lOPO MT) 
9653 3.4 0.03 
9775 7.3 0.07 
13400 12.1 0.09 
13423 14.6 0.10 
12810 11.2 0.08 
14114 9.1 0.06 
17533 2.7 0.01 
17069 6.1 0.03 
19008 5.7 0.03 
19993 5.2 0.02 
Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change Base Change % Change 
Argentina sorghum price (pesos/MT)^ Argentina corn ej^x^rts (1000.MT)^ 
71 -304451 -29 -0.00 -38044 -4.5 -0.01 
72 -271495 -108 -0.03 -19893 -9.7 -0.04 
73 -237272 -233 -0.09 -9116 -13.9 -0.15 
74 -233193 -340 -0.14 -6294 -16.9 -0.26 
.75 56810 -1075 -1.89 3512 -18.3 -0.52 
76 1222769 -3667 -0.29 4064 -10.4 -0.25 
77 1957061 -3603 -0.18 26452 -43.6 -0.16 
78 8172692 -17978 -0.22 7218 -8.3 -0.11 
79 13500887 -27582 -0.20 5653 -5.1 -0.09 
80 21643615 -39917 -0.18 3769 -4.2 -0.11 
Argentina sorghum exports (1000 MT)^ Canada coarse grain price (Can $/MT) 




 1 63.28 -0.04 -0.07 








73 -124 -2.17 -1.74 114.64 -0.24 -0.21 
74 1162 -2.65 -0.22 117.47 -0.36 -0.30 
75 2316 -2.86 -0.12 110.93 -0.29 -0.26 
76 3148 -1.63 -0.05 106.41 -0.24 -0.22 




















-0.02 132.25 -0.25 -0.19 
80 1254 -0.66 -0.05 150.94 -0.26 -0.17 
^Repeated attempts were made to detect the cause of the negative numbers in these tables and 
the high RMs (reported earlier) for Argentina. One likely cause is the SAS programming regression 
precision versus the simulation precision. For simulation, the observed Argentinean exchange 
rate might have been read as zero, for the period 1960-1973, since its magnitude was on the 
order of 10"?. However, because of Argentinean hyper-inflation, the exchange rate grew very 
rapidly eliminating the problem for the 1974-80 period. 
Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change Base Change % Change 
Canada coarse grain export (1000 MT) South Africa coarse grain export (1000 MT) 
71 5627 -1.9 -0.03 2883 0 0 






3178 0 0 




3866 0 0 
74 1822 -11.0 -0.60 2800 0 0 
75 2459 -8.0 -0.32 1708 0 0 




3006 0 0 
77 3588 -2.0 -0.05 3442 0 0 
78 3636 -5.7 -0.15 2307 0 0 





1 3653 0 0 
80 4017 1 00
 
-0.12 5286 0 0 





 1 -0.09 3101 -1,3 -0,04 
72 68.98 -0.11 -0.17 2577 -2.9 -0,11 
73 85.91 -0.21 -0.24 2786 -4.5 -0,16 
74 89.21 -0.30 -0.34 2696 -5.6 -0.21 
75 88.92 -0.26 -0.29 2851 -4.1 -0.14 
76 94.37 -0.23 -0.25 2801 -3.3 -0.11 
77 49.86 -0.09 -0.18 1797 -1.1 -0,06 
78 105.73 -0.23 -0.22 3033 -2.8 -0,09 
79 110.07 -0.23 -0,21 3100 -2,5 -0,08 
80 124.83 -0.24 -0.19 2283 -2,3 -0,10 
Table 4.5 (Continued) 
Base Change % Change Base Change % Chang 
Thailand coarse grain price (baht/MT) Thailand coarse grain exports (1000 MT) 
71 1433.54 -1.21 -0.08 2215 -0.3 -0.01 
72 1875.72 -3.09 -0.16 1560 -0.9 -0.05 
73 2755.23 -6.42 -0.23 2331 -1.6 -0.07 











2549 -1.4 -0.05 
76 2552.64 -6.22 -0.24 2390 -1.1 -0.04 






78 2646.13 -5.80 -0.21 2071 -0.9 -0.04 
79 2696.09 -5.57 -0.20 2281 
CO 0











1 2283 -0.7 -0.03 
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is as expected. Both exports and prices decrease in all 
export competing regions. 
The immediate effect of an increase in the U.S. money 
supply agrees with the a priori expectations for all coun­
tries. The highest percent change of all variables occurs 
in or immediately following the year of the adoption of 
flexible exchange rate (1973). The shock affects the U.S. 
coarse grain production a year later. This is because the 
acreage planted decisions are made on the basis of the lagged 
prices. The percentage change of all variables is decreasing 
as time passes. Some variables are more stable than others 
and move faster toward their equilibrium levels. The re­
sults of this model show responses to the exogenous shock in 
the expected directions. The model is stable since after 
the shock, all variables move back to their base values over 
time. 
Overall, this model's performance is satisfactory. All 
behavioral equations have good predictability. The relation­
ships among all variables agree with prior economic expec­
tations. The dynamic historical simulation has reasonably 
good statistical properties, and the model is also stable 
and adjusts toward equilibrium after an exogenous shock. 
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CHAPTER V. DYNAMIC U.S. MONEY SUPPLY SIMULATION 
Models are often constructed and utilized to predict how 
a change in one variable is likely to affect other variables 
over time. One objective of this research is to better 
understand and quantify the interrelationship among the 
world's major coarse grain trade participants in order to 
evaluate the impacts of alternative events or policies on 
these markets. Of particular interest to this study is the 
relationship between the U.S. and world agricultural markets 
and the U.S. monetary sector. In this chapter, the effect of 
growth in the U.S. money supply on the world coarse grain 
market is analyzed through dynamic simulation of the world 
coarse grain market model discussed in the previous chapter. 
In this simulation, it did not seem reasonable to assume 
that the monetary authority would alter money supply growth 
in only one year. It is therefore assumed that the monetary 
authority increases the money growth target resulting in a 
once and for all increase in the money supply rather than 
a single year increase in the money supply. This results 
in a compounding effect. That is, the consequent changes 
in the exchange rate, trade prices, and the other endogenous 
variables in any period will include the dynamic effects of 
the increase in the money supply of all previous periods. 
Before presenting the rate of growth of the actual and 
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altered levels of the money supply, it should be emphasized, 
as discussed in Chapter I, that changes in money supply 
before the demise of the Bretton-Woods system had little 
effect on the value of the U.S. dollar. Therefore, the 
simulation is performed only for the decade of the 19 70s. 
Table 5.1 compares the actual and simulated annual and 
average compound rates of growth of the U.S. money supply. 
The simulated increase in the money supply assumes that the 
U.S. monetary authority allows the money supply to grow by 
five billion dollars a year in the manner explained above. 
Table 5.1. Actual and altered growth rate of U.S. money 
supply 
Year Annual Growth Rate (%) Actual Altered Difference 
71 13.5 14 .3 .8 
72 13.0 13.6 .6 
73 6.9 7.5 .6 
74 5.5 6 .0 .5 
75 12.6 12.9 .3 
76 13.7 13.9 .2 
77 10.6 10.7 .1 
78 8.0 8.1 .1 
79 7.9 8.0 .1 
80 8.9 9.0 .1 
Compound 
growth rate 9.6 9.9 .3 
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The expansionary effect of the simulated increase in the 
money supply tends to depreciate the U.S. dollar as explained 
in previous chapters. This depreciation acts as an implicit 
subsidy making U.S. coarse grain more price competitive in 
international markets. The associated increase in the 
quantity demanded of U.S. coarse grains by importing countries 
leads to a general rise in the U.S. coarse grain price, 
which in turn brings about an increase in U.S. coarse grain 
production over time as well as a decrease in the U.S. do­
mestic coarse grain disappearance in each year. A conse­
quent reduction in demand for the coarse grain of the other 
exporting regions leads to a general decrease in their 
domestic prices. 
Simulation of the model as described in Chapter III 
produced perverse results for the USSR, due to initial 
misspecification of the price linkage equation for the USSR. 
The USSR coarse grain price was originally calculated in the 
model as the U.S. coarse grain price in terms of gold. Given 
an exogenous gold value of the dollar, this price linkage 
specification required the "USSR coarse grain price" to in­
crease along with the U.S. price as a result of an expansion­
ary U.S. monetary policy. As a consequence, USSR coarse 
grain imports declined as the U.S. currency depreciated in 
value. To avoid this problem, the gold-dollar exchange rate 
was subsequently endogenized and an alternative USSR price 
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linkage equation was specified (see Appendix B for the modi­
fied specifications and the estimated results) . 
Table 5.2 reports the results of the simulation. As 
expected, the expansionary U.S. monetary policy exacerbates 
a situation of excess supply in the money market which depreci­
ates the U.S. currency and, thus, increases the demand for the 
U.S. coarse grain on the international market. The exchange 
rate depreciates continually, falling by 35.1 yen/$ (10.6 per­
cent) between 1971-1980. U.S. exports increase more rapidly 
with the adoption of flexible exchange rates in 1973 than in 
the late 1970s, corresponding to the nature of the simulated 
growth in the U.S. money supply. Table 5.1 indicates that 
the U.S. money supply is increased at a faster rate in the 
early than the late 1970s. The U.S. feed, nonfeed, and in­
ventory demands respond in a similar pattern to the U.S. 
exports, but in the opposite direction. The simulated in­
crease in U.S. coarse grain production is smaller than the 
increase in the U.S. coarse grain import demand, pushing 
up the U.S. coarse grain price on average over the period. 
The increase in U.S. coarse grain exports is absorbed 
by increases in imports by Japan and the USSR. However, the 
USSR reacts more dramatically than Japan, because of the 
higher estimated USSR price elasticity of import demand. 
The world coarse grain market is characterized by 
Table 5.2. Dynamic impact of a sustained linear increase of the U.S. money supply 
Year Base Change % Change Base Change % Change 
U.S . exchange rate (yen/$) U.S. coarse grain price (U.S 
71 330.27 -0.38 -0.11 64.67 0.023 0.03 
72 308.69 -1.25 -0.40 77.36 0.080 0.10 
73 291.79 -2.49 -0.85 106.97 0,204 0.19 
74 278.51 -3.98 -1.43 126.37 0.241 0,19 
75 289.92 -4.60 -1.58 111.80 0,293 0,26 
76 306.47 -5.12 -1,67 104.41 0.309 0,29 
77 262.55 -4.62 -1.76 56.07 0.390 0,69 
78 213.43 -3.97 -1.86 110.36 0.237 0.21 
79 223.70 -4.34 -1.94 111.21 0.208 0.18 
80 221.63 -4.39 -1.98 133.30 0.274 0,20 
U,S, nonfeed coarse grain demand (1000 MT) U.S. coarse grain exports (IC 
71 12180 -0.34 -0.00 73784 34 0.04 
72 12936 -1,28 -0.00 58510 126 0.21 
73 13546 -3.12 -0.02 47407 304 0.64 
74 14243 -4.38 -0.03 54283 338 0.62 
75 15277 -5.58 -0.03 62035 381 0.61 
76 16499 -6.34 -0.03 47730 392 0.82 
77 18225 -7.32 -0.04 33413 461 1.38 
78 19490 -6.47 -0.03 57231 330 0.57 
79 20963 -5.51 -0.02 67528 237 0.35 
80 22451 -5.15 -0.02 66899 242 0.36 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change 
U.S. feed coarse grain demand (1000 MT) 




72 132061 —86.0 -0.06 
73 142025 -205.5 -0.14 
74 89297 -218.6 -0.24 
75 103755 -243.2 -0.23 




























U.S. coarse grain inventory (1000 MT) 
71 43489 -8.1 -0.01 
72 30683 -25.0 -0.08 
73 21878 -59.0 -0.27 
74 11674 -60.2 -0.51 
75 25668 -66.2 -0.25 
76 29077 -63.4 -0.21 
77 45074 -76.1 -0.16 
78 37312 -29.5 -0.07 
79 50348 -27.9 -0.05 
80 41148 -38.7 -0.09 
Base Change % Change 
U.S. coarse grain production (1000 MT) 
206079 00.00 0.00 
189987 13.66 0.00 
195406 37.06 0.01 
149058 55.22 0.03 
192891 65.99 0.03 
192620 80.99 0.04 
206636 90.74 0.04 
203793 132.70 0.06 
240525 76.19 0.03 
196399 50.17 0.02 
Japan coarse grain price (yen/MT) 
26637.6 -21.12 -0.07 
29769.0 -90.15 -0.30 
38871.7 -257,61 -0.66 
43815.3 -543.58 -1.24 
40361.9 -534.75 -1.32 
39845.5 -548.85 -1.37 
18397.5 -197.00 -1.07 
29361.5 -483.46 -1.64 
31005.5 -543.38 -1.75 
36799.1 -653.02 -1.77 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change 
Gold price ($/ounce) 
71 46.097 0.13 0.29 
72 59.953 0.63 1.05 
73 72.210 1.60 2.22 
74 200.529 7.54 3.76 
75 163.416 6.83 4.18 
76 120.169 5. 30 4.41 
77 174.476 8.12 4.65 
78 224.310 11.07 4.93 
79 527.257 27.15 5.15 
80 583.672 30.69 5.25 
USSR coarse grain imports (1000 MT) 
71 2152 21.9 1.01 
72 3352 73.6 2.19 
73 -880 176.9 20.10 
74 5636 130.5 2.31 
75 12234 155.4 1.27 
76 2789 205.7 7.37 
77 11210 73.3 0.65 
78 8038 133.1 1.65 
79 14443 59.9 0.41 
80 14890 65.9 0.44 
Base Change % Change 
USSR coarse grain price (ounces of gold/MT) 
1.40 -0.00 -0.2600 
1.28 -0.01 -0.9501 
1.48 -0.02 -1.9859 
0.63 -0.02 -3.4445 
0.68 -0.02 -3.7778 
0.86 -0.03 -3.9383 
0.32 -0.01 -3.7921 
0.49 -0.02 -4.4990 
0.21 -0.00 -4.7217 
0.22 -0.01 -4.8004 
Japan coarse grain imports (1000 MT) 
9653 3.4 0.03 
9775 14.3 0.14 
13400 35.9 0.26 
13423 57.7 0.43 
12810 55.1 0.43 
14114 53.9 0.38 
17533 19.0 0.10 
17069 47.8 0.28 
19008 50.3 0.26 
19993 51.1 0.25 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change 
Argentina corn price (pesos/MT) 
71 -298997 -34 -0. 01 
72 -260622 -245 -0. 09 
73 -220772 -800 -0. 36 
74 -216022 -1556 -0. 72 
75 121667 -6136 -5. 04 
76 1479346 -25081 -1. 69 
77 2334380 -28653 -1. 22 
78 9572061 -163233 -1. 70 
79 15776383 -282470 -1. 79 
80 25258036 -454279 -1. 79 
Argentina sorghum exports (1000 MT) 
71 -5479 -0.71 -0.01 
72 -3131 -2.95 -0.09 
73 -124 -6.42 -5.15 
74 1162 -10.41 -0.89 
75 2316 -14.03 -0.60 
76 3148 -9.57 -0.30 
77 7265 -46.59 -0.64 
78 4380 -10.15 -0.23 
79 3912 -7.05 -0.18 
80 1254 -6.46 -0.51 
Base Change % Change 








-271495 -210 -0.07 
-237272 -687 -0.28 
-233193 -1337 -0.57 
56810 -5270 -9.27 
1222769 -21538 -1.76 
1957061 -24606 -1.25 
8172692 -140182 -1.71 
13500887 -242581 -1.79 
21643615 -390129 -1.80 
Argentina corn exports (1000 MT] 
-38044 -4.5 -0.01 
-19893 -18.8 -0.09 
-9116 -41.0 -0.45 
-6294 -66.5 -1.05 
3512 -89.7 -2.55 
4064 -61.2 -1.50 
26452 -297.9 -1.12 
7218 —64.9 -0.89 
5653 -45.0 -0.79 
3769 -41.3 -1.09 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change 
Canada coarse grain price (Can $/MT) 
71 63.28 -0.04 -0.07 
72 78.98 -0.22 -0.28 
73 114.64 -0.73 -0.64 
74 117.47 -1.41 -1.20 
75 110.93 -1.42 -1.28 
76 106.41 -1.41 -1.33 
77 60.06 -0.60 -1.00 






80 150.94 -2.61 -1.73 
Australia coarse grain price (Aus $/MT) 





72 68.98 -0.23 -0.33 
73 85.91 -0.61 -0.72 
74 89.21 -1.20 -1.34 
75 88.92 -1.27 -1.43 
76 94.37 -1.40 -1.48 
77 49.86 -0.61 -1.23 
78 105.73 -1.86 -1.76 
79 110.07 -2.06 -1.87 
80 124.83 -2.34 -1.88 
Base Change % Change 
Canada coarse grain exports (1000 MT) 






3927 -8.8 -0.22 
2016 -25,9 -1.28 
1822 -43.2 -2.37 
2459 -39.3 -1.59 
3426 -35.7 -1.04 
3588 -14.2 -0.39 
3636 -45.0 -1.23 
3311 -45.2 -1.36 
4017 -47.2 -1.17 
Australia coarse grain exports (1000 MT) 
3101 -1.3 -0.04 
2577 -5.6 -0.22 







2851 -20.4 -0.71 
2801 -19.7 -0.70 
1797 -7.9 -0.44 
3033 -22.4 1 o
 
3100 -22.6 -0.73 
2283 -23.1 -1.01 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Year Base Change % Change Base Change % Change 
Thailand coarse grain price (baht/MT) Thailand coarse grain exports (1000 MT) 






72 1875.72 -5.99 -0.31 1560 -1.77 -0.11 
73 2755.23 -18.94 —0.68 2331 —4.86 -0.20 
74 2858.41 -36.74 -1.28 2300 -7.57 -0.32 
75 2582.16 -35.58 -1.37 2549 -6.96 -0.27 
76 2552.64 -36.58 -1.43 2390 -6.87 -0.28 
77 1251.02 -14.50 -1.15 1250 -2.53 -0.20 
78 2646.13 -45,27 -1.71 2071 -7.33 -0.35 
79 2696.09 -49.06 -1.81 2281 -7.22 -0.31 
80 3116.95 -57.14 -1.83 2283 -7.03 -0.30 
South Africa coarse grain export (1000 MT) 
71 2883 0 0 
72 3178 0 0 
73 3866 0 0 
74 2800 0 0 
75 1708 0 0 
76 3006 0 0 
77 3442 0 0 
78 2307 0 0 
79 3653 0 0 
80 5286 0 0 
171 
substantial governmental market intervention and other obsta­
cles that tend to prevent frictionless adjustments to changes in 
the underlying economic structure of the market. If exchange 
rates and coarse grain prices were determined in a per­
fectly free market, then the increase in import demand (as 
a result of the dollar depreciation) would tend to counter­
balance the effect of the depreciation over time. The world 
gold market is a free market and therefore, the price of 
gold reacts more dramatically to an increase in the U.S. 
money supply than other variables. Consequently, the "USSR 
price" is affected more by this shock than is Japan's price. 
The increase in the growth of the U.S. money supply 
also affects the markets of other coarse grain exporting 
countries (except South Africa) adversely. Both their 
exports and prices decrease as expected. However, the 
share of the adjustment accounted for by each country depends 
upon the relative sizes of their elasticities of price trans­
mission and price elasticities of export supply. In any 
event, the overall share of world coarse grain exports by 
these countries, as well as their export revenues declines. 
Table 5.3 presents the long-run or dynamic multi­
pliers in percentage terms. In essence, these are long-run 
elasticities because they indicate the percent change in 
price, exports and imports from the given percent change 
in money supply over the period . Chambers and Just (1982) 
Table 5.3. Dynamic elasticities of the sustained 
U.S. money supply^ 





export or import Market Share^ 
impact impact Base Simulation 
USA 0.0924 0.2055 71.57 72.89 
a.- d Argentina -0.7371 (-0.7448) -0.3225 (-0.3189) 11.27 10.62 
Canada 
-0.4938 -0.3720 5.13 4.77 
Australia 
-0.5487 -0.2416 3.99 3.82 
S. Africa 0.0 0.0 4.87 4.87 
Thailand 
-0.5194 -0.1015 3.18 3.02 
Japan 
-0.4743 0.1086 20.67 20.67 
USSR 
-0.9699 0.6088 8.89 9.06 
^These are dynamic multipliers calculated in percentage forms which can be 
interpreted as long-run elasticities (see p. 171). 
^Calculated at the same mean over the period 1971-1980. 
*^Share as a percent of the six largest exports. 
^For corn and sorghum, respectively. 
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calculated such elasticities for a nonlinear, quarterly, 
closed U.S. corn-soybean-wheat model. The complication 
is that in a nonlinear model such as this, or Chambers and Just 
(1982), the sizes of dynamic multipliers depend upon the sizes 
of the variations of the exogenous variable. In linear 
models, the same multipliers would be obtained regardless 
of the size of the shock. Furthermore, the multipliers 
would be the same whatever the initial value of the en­
dogenous variables of interest. This would not necessarily 
be the case in a nonlinear model. In a nonlinear model, 
large variations in the exogenous variable could yield dif­
ferent multipliers than a small variation, and those multi­
pliers would also differ for different starting values of 
the endogenous variables of interest. For this reason, 
dynamic multipliers for nonlinear models should be pre­
sented together with information about how they were calcu­
lated. In this case, the variation is a constant linear 
growth of the U.S. money supply (five billion dollars each 
year) for the period 1971-1980. 
The long-run elasticities in Table 5.3 are particularly 
interesting. In the long-run, such an expansionary monetary 
policy leads to inelastic responses of prices, imports and 
exports in the world coarse grain market. However, the U.S. 
coarse grain price responds much less than the prices in other 
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countries to the U.S. money supply expansion while world 
trade (exports and imports) responds by less than prices in 
non-U.S. regions (see Table 5.3). This phenomenon can best 
be explained by an examination of the price elasticities of 
the export supplies and impoirt demands of the world coarse 
grain market participants. 
As the estimated elasticities reported in Chapter IV 
indicate, the world net excess coarse grain demand is fairly 
inelastic. This was, of course, expected for the policy 
reasons given in Chapter II. The major coarse grain importing 
nations of the world are developed countries which are highly 
protective of their markets. Therefore, the shift in the 
U.S. coarse grain export supply curve as a result of the 
change in U.S. monetary policy brings about a small change 
in the quantity of coarse grain traded in world markets 
and a relatively larger change in the prices of importing 
regions. 
The price response in exporting regions, however, 
depends upon the export supply elasticities. The U.S. export 
supply is elastic (3.2)^ resulting in a very small increase 
in the U.S. coarse grain price (0.09%). The price responses 
of the other exporting regions are comparatively larger 
^Calculated by dividing the long-run quantity impact 
by the long-run price impact (Table 5.3). 
174b 
than that of the U.S. because their export supplies are 
much less price elastic than that of the U.S. The price 
responses outside the United States are much larger, in per­
centage terms, than the U.S. price response because of the 
high price elasticity of the U.C. export supply combined 
with the low price elasticity of the net import demand facing 
the United States. 
Chambers and Just (1982) and Schuh (1983) claim that 
U.S. monetary policy has particularly dramatic and probably 
adverse effects on U.S. agricultural exports and prices. 
However, such an effect on export requires a price-elastic 
net import demand facing the United States. At the same time, 
a large effect of monetary policy on U.S. prices requires a 
price-inelastic U.S. export supply. In contrast, this study 
suggests that the import demand for coarse grains facing the 
United States is inelastic (rather than elastic) and that the 
U.S. coarse grain export supply is quite elastic (rather 
than inelastic). As a consequence, monetary policy has a 
relatively small effect on both U.S. prices and exports of 
coarse grains. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The general concern of this study was the effect of U.S. 
monetary policy on the U.S. agricultural sector. The specific 
objectives were to investigate the nature of U.S. monetary 
policy (during 1960-1980), to investigate the channels 
through which U.S. monetary policy influences world agri­
cultural markets, and, finally, to conceptualize a world 
coarse grain market with which to evaluate the impact of 
U.S. monetary policy on agriculture. The study also pro­
vides a qualitative description of the world coarse grain 
market structure and existing policies affecting the market. 
This study followed the monetary approach to exchange 
rate determination to construct a world model of the coarse 
grain market which included six major exporting countries— 
the U.S., Argentina, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and 
Thailand—and two major importing countries--Japan, and 
the USSR. Other importing countries entered the model 
exogenously. The nonlinear, nonspatial equilibrium model 
explicitly included the domestic sector of the U.S.coarse 
grain market while only considering the world market behavior 
of other world market participants through reduced form, net 
trade equations. Prices in the model were connected in a 
manner which accounted for the policies used by other 
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exporting and importing regions. 
The estimation of the model utilized data for the 1960-
1980 period. The estimation technique utilized to derive 
the structural coefficients was nonlinear, truncated, two 
stage least squares with principal components. The estimation 
algorithm was from the SAS-ETS program. The model contained 
76 exogenous variables and 41 equations including behavioral 
relationships, market clearing identities, and technical 
relationships. The major endogenous variables were U.S. 
feed, nonfeed, and inventory demands and supply and all 
regions' prices and net trades. The estimated behavioral 
equations had acceptable statistical properties. The esti­
mated directional relationships among variables coincided 
a priori with expectations. The validation of the model 
through historical simulation proved satisfactory. 
also converged to equilibrium after an exogenous shock indi­
cating that the model was stable. The model also tracked 
turning points of variables well. Some important conclusions 
concerning the world coarse grain market based on the em­
pirical analysis are discussed below. 
First, the U.S. acreage planted is inelastic with respect 
to prices of the previous period. Corn acreage responds 
significantly to corn diversion policy and is influenced 
by the acreage planted of the last period indicating a slow 
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adjustment to changing economic incentives. 
Second, U.S. feed, nonfeed, and inventory demands are 
all price inelastic (-0.36, -0.59, and -0.73, respectively). 
Feed demand is elastic with respect to the included live­
stock related variables. Nonfeed demand is influenced by 
demand in the previous period indicating the importance of 
exponentially growing technology. The inventory demand is 
influenced by transaction and speculative demands. However, 
the influence of coarse grain production on inventory demand 
seems to be almost as important as the price. 
. Third, the U.S. exchange rate is found to be determined 
in a monetary environment. The money supply of both the 
U.S. and the importing country are found to have nearly 
identical effects on the exchange rate. The elasticity 
of the exchange rate is about -0.6 8 with respect to the 
U.S. money supply and 0.4 with respect to the U.S. interest 
rate. Interest rates apparently influence the value of 
the exchange rate as suggested by monetary theory. The U.S. 
discount rate, however, appears to have more effect than 
that of Japan. 
Fourth, in the category of the importing regions, the 
USSR demand for coarse grain imports is elastic with respect 
to its production and price. In addition, the gold price of 
the U.S. dollar is shown to have a large effect on Soviet 
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decisions to import. Japan, however, is completely dependent 
on imports (100 percent of its consumption) and demonstrates 
very little response to price changes. On the other hand, 
Japan's livestock sector and rice production influence its 
trading behavior significantly. In addition, it is also 
found that Japan allows near perfect transmission of the 
changes in the world coarse grain market conditions into 
its domestic economy. 
Fifth, all exporting regions except South Africa, 
allow for perfect transmission of the changes in world market 
conditions. The South African government, on the other hand, 
isolates its market completely from the world market. The 
estimated price elasticities of exports are 0.601 for 
Argentina's corn, 0.21 for Argentina's sorghum, 1.307 for 
Canada, 0.769 for Australia, 0.0 for South Africa, and 0.266 
for Thailand. Not surprisingly, variables closely related to 
the livestock sector such as livestock price, grain con­
suming animal units, or income are found to influence the 
trading behavior of these regions significantly. 
The major objective of this study is to evaluate the 
world market impacts of U.S. monetary policy. Conse­
quently, the effects of a 5 billion dollar sustained increase 
in the U.S. money supply is simulated dynamically. The dif­
ferences between the new levels of the endogenous variables 
in the model and their base values are taken as the specific 
179 
impacts of such a policy change upon those variables. The 
percentage impacts and the long-run elasticities are also 
calculated for the key variables. The more interesting 
results from this simulation are summarized below. 
First, the excess supply of money created in the 
monetary sector tends to depreciate the value of U.S. 
currency. Depreciation makes U.S. coarse grain more price 
competitive in international markets and the products of the 
export competing regions less so. The associated increase 
in demand for U.S. coarse grain, however, leads to only a 
relative small increase in the domestic U.S. price and ex­
ports from the U.S. This occurs because of the relatively 
high U.S. export supply elasticity and the relatively low 
elasticity of the net import demand facing the United States. 
Second, world market prices decrease by relatively more 
than the U.S. price increases leading to a reduction in the 
exports of competing regions and a small improvement in 
the competitive position of the U.S. in the world market. 
These results are particularly interesting in the light 
of recent attempts to tighten the U.S. money supply. Appa­
rently, such a policy does not have dramatically adverse 
effects on U.S. coarse grain exports. In addition, the 
response of the domestic U.S. coarse grain market is also 
fairly minor. Therefore, contractionary monetary policy has 
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only a small effect on the domestic U.S. coarse grain market. 
This study provides some important information concerning 
the largely unexplored relationship between agriculture, in 
general, and the monetary sector. A few very recent studies 
have found that fluctuations in monetary variables affect 
the U.S. agricultural sector.because the exchange rate itself 
is a monetary variable. While the results of this study 
suggest that these effects are small in the world coarse grain 
market, one must bear in mind that the agricultural markets in 
this model are linked to the monetary sector only through the 
U.S. exchange rate determination process. With little doubt, 
the effects reported here would be magnified if the interest 
rate, capital market and other linkages were specified. 
The model developed in this study can be used to 
evaluate the consequences of specific policy issues of 
interest influencing the world coarse grain market. The 
model includes all the major trading participants. However, 
certain extensions of the model would allow additional policy 
analyses in other desired areas. These might include the 
following : 
(1) to include the influence of changes in U.S. monetary 
policy on the industrial and other sectors of the U.S. 
macroeconomy which would likely affect the demand 
for coarse grain; 
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(2) to include the effect of the U.S. discount and 
corresponding interest rates on coarse grain pro­
duction. The interest rate level determines, to a 
large extent, the amount farmers borrow to finance 
either the purchases of new land and equipment or 
the actual planting of coarse grain. Such effects, 
coupled with those specified in this study may be 
too large to be ignored; 
(3) to endogenize explicitly the domestic markets of 
the other regions in the model. For example, all 
other exporting regions in this study are capable 
of producing more coarse grain than they do. 
Endogenizing coarse grain production in these 
regions might influence the results considerably; 
(4) to endogenize the livestock sectors in each region. 
Coarse grain is used largely as a livestock feed. 
Consequently, the demand for coarse grain is derived 
from the demand for feed by the livestock sector. 
Endogenizing the livestock sector of each region 
would better reflect the forces which influence 
coarse grain markets; 
(5) to remove the implicit assumption in this study 
that the exchange rates of the other regions are 
exogenous. The monetary policies of these regions 
are also important in the determination of the 
impact of U.S. monetary policy. The monetary policy 
actions of these other regions may also offset the 
effects of the policies pursued in the United States; 
and 
(6) to consider the effect of monetary policy on other 
sectors of U.S. agriculture which would promote an 
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APPENDIX A; DEFINITIONS OF COMMODITIES AND COUNTRIES 
IN THE WORLD COARSE GRAIN MARKET 
The term "feed grains" normally refers to the four low-
protein grains fed to livestock—corn, barley, oats, and 
sorghum. The term "coarse grain" generally includes the 
four feed grains and rye, a high protein grain. Bjarnason 
(1967) and Collins (1977) demonstrate that corn, barley, 
oats, and sorghum are very close substitutes as animal 
feeds, while rye is mostly used as food. They also argue 
that prices of feed grains have a very high positive correla­
tion. For this reason, and the difficulty of obtaining rye 
data for U.S. trade partners, the term "coarse grain" as 
used in this study refers only to corn, barley, oats, and 
sorghum. Aggregation of these grains on a metric ton basis 
does not pose serious problems. 
The classification of countries into coarse grain ex­
porting and importing regions as used in this study is pro­
vided in Table Al. 
Table Al. Classification of countries into export and import regions of the world 
Position Region Countries 
















Centrally Planned (CP) 
10. USSR 
11. China (PRC) 
12. Eastern Europe (EE) 
Belgium and Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, West Germany 
Japan 
Rest of DC's: Austria, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Malta, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand 
Soviet Union 
People's Republic of China 
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Yugoslavia 
Rapidly Developing Economies (LDCR) 
13. OPEC Algeria, Equador, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libra, Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela 
14. NONOPEC Brazil, Hong Kong, Mexico, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan 
Table Al (Continued) 
Position Region Countries 
Moderately Developing 
Economies 
15. LDCM Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burma, Camaroon, Cam­
bodia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Dahomey, Domi 
nican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica 
Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, N. Korea, Outer 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Rhodesia, Rwanda, Senegal, Somali Republic, South Yemen, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Tobago, Trinidad, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Zaire, Zambia 
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APPENDIX B: MODIFIED USSR PRICE LINKAGE EQUATION 
The "USSR coarse grain price" initially utilized in this 





PRICEIO^ = "the USSR coarse grain price", ounces/MT; 
CWPl^ = the U.S. coarse grain price, US $/MT; 
PRGOLD78^ = price of gold in dollars, US $/ounce. 
While CWPl^ is endogenous in the model, the gold price 
of the dollar was exogenous leading to perverse results for 
Soviet imports in the U.S. monetary policy simulation. 
Consequently, an alternative equation was used to endogenize 
the gold price. The equation was specified as follows: 
(-) (+) (+) 
LOGPR^ = f(LE8US^,LL0GPR^,DUMG^) 
where 
LOGPR = natural log of gold in U.S. $ (?,; 'J.TJ ./ounce) ; 
LE8US = natural log of the yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate; 
LPR = lag of the dependent variable; 
DUMG = dummy to account for the shift from fixed to 
flexible exchange rates in 1973. 
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The premise here is that gold is an investment com­
modity that reacts to changes in the U.S. dollar value of 
foreign currency. For example, if the U.S. money supply is 
expected to grow faster, then there would be a shift in 
portfolio assets from dollars into gold, which would in­
crease the gold price. The lagged gold price captures the 
speed of adjustment. Under the Bretton-Woods system, the 
U.S. supported the gold price of the dollar. Consequently, 
changes in the U.S. money supply did not affect the gold 
price or U.S. dollar value of foreign currencies. As was 
explained in Chapters I and II, the adoption of flexible 
exchange rates contributed to the increase in the world money 
supply, making gold a more favorable asset. 
The nonlinear estimation of this equation, within the 
model, produced the following results: 
LOGPR. =16.58 - 2.56*LE8US. + 0.579*LLOGPR, 




R^ = 0.9865 DW = 3.04 
where the t-statistics are reported in parentheses and the 
elasticity in brackets. 
The statistical properties of this equation are good 
with almost 99 percent of the historical variation 
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explained. All variables have the correct sign and are 
significant at the .02 percent level. 
